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Beyond the Class Action:
Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy in
Non-Class Collective Representation
Howard M. Erichsont
INTRODUCTION
In broad areas of litigation, individual attorney-client rela-
tionships lull our profession into a false sense that clients are
adequately protected. Unlike class actions, in which the agency
problems of collective representation are well recognized, non-
class litigation involves individual representation and appears
not to raise similar problems. A class action lawyer understands
that she represents the collective interests of the class. Class
members, the court, and the public understand this as well. By
contrast, the lawyer representing a mass of similarly situated
individual clients believes that her loyalty runs to each client in-
dividually. In reality, however, the lawyer often represents those
clients collectively, seeking to maximize the interests of the group
as a whole. Such collective representation is not necessarily a bad
thing. To the contrary, effective litigation sometimes requires it.
Collective representation enables clients to pursue litigation that
otherwise would present insurmountable obstacles. But outside of
class actions, the profession's failure to recognize the collective
nature of much litigation has left clients unprotected, and has
engendered an ethical murkiness that leaves lawyers unsure
whether they owe their loyalty to the individual or to the collec-
tive.
Class actions get all the attention. That, of course, is one rea-
son savvy plaintiffs' lawyers file them. Class actions generate
publicity, which in turn draws additional clients and creates set-
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tlement leverage. Not only lawyers and the press are captivated,
but so are the judges, policymakers, and academics who have
spent a decade lavishing attention on class actions. Courts, in-
cluding the Supreme Court on several recent occasions, have ren-
dered prominent decisions on a range of class action issues.! Fed-
eral rulemakers have pored over the class action rule, producing
several rounds of provocative ideas that resulted this year in a
package of proposed reforms. Congress has engaged in actual
and attempted class action reform.3 The academic literature has
burgeoned, offering insights on the dangers of settlement class
' See, for example, Devlin v Scardelletti, 536 US 1 (2002) (holding that unnamed
class member who objected in a timely manner to approval of class action settlement at
the fairness hearing had the power to bring an appeal without first intervening); Ortiz v
Fibreboard Corp, 527 US 815 (1999) (holding that certification of mandatory settlement
class on limited fund requires showing that fund is limited independently of agreement by
the parties, and that the class include all those with claims unsatisfied and the time of
settlement with intraclass conflicts addressed); Amchem Products, Inc v Windsor, 521 US
591 (1997) (holding district court faced with request for settlement-only certification need
not inquire whether case would present intractable problems of trial management, but
other requirements must still be satisfied); Matsushita v Epstein, 516 US 367 (1996) (hold-
ing that plaintiffs who are members of both state and federal classes, and neither opted
out of settlement nor appeared at hearing to contest settlement, could not subsequently
relitigate claims barred by the state court settlement in federal court); In Re Bridge-
stone/Firestone, Inc, 288 F3d 1012 (7th Cir 2002) (holding that the matter was not man-
ageable as either a nationwide class action, or an action with classes certified for each of
the fifty states); Stephenson v Dow Chemical Co, 273 F3d 249 (2d Cir 2001) (holding that
veterans were not adequately represented in prior class action, such that it was not a bar
to their claims), cert granted, 123 S Ct 485 (2002); In re Cendant Corp Litigation, 264 F3d
201 (3d Cir 2001) (holding that court's approval of settlement was warranted; lead plain-
tiff adequately represented the class against the corporation; intra-class conflict was not
established; class member had not waived right to object to lead plaintiffs decision to
conduct auction to select lead counsel; and use of auction to select lead counsel supplants
lead plaintiffs right to select and retain counsel); In re Prudential Insurance Co of America
Sales Practices Litigation, 148 F3d 283 (3d Cir 1998) (approving class certification, set-
tlement, notice, and fees awarded in class action brought on behalf of over eight million
policy holders); Castano v American Tobacco, 84 F3d 734 (5th Cir 1996) (holding that
multistate class would be decertified because federal district court failed to consider how
variations in state law would affect predominance and superiority and class independently
failed the superiority requirement); In the matter of Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc, 51 F3d
1293 (7th Cir 1995) (holding that certification was precluded by concerns for protection of
Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury in federal civil cases, undue and unnecessary
risk of entrusting determination of potential multibillion dollar liabilities to single jury,
and questionable constitutionality of trying diverse case under legal standard in force in
no state).
' See Proposed Amendments to FRCP 23 (May 20, 2002); Proposed Amendments to
FRCP 23 (1996); Draft Proposed Amendments to FRCP 23(c)(1)(A) (Feb 1995) (on file with
author). State rulemakers, too, have engaged in class action reform. See, for example, Cal
Rules of Ct 1850-60.
' See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 USC § 78u-4(b)(2). The
proposed Class Action Fairness Act, HR 2341, which would expand federal jurisdiction
over class actions, passed the House on March 13, 2002.
5191 CURRENT ISSUES IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 521
actions, 4 the opportunities of class settlement structures, 5 the se-
lection of class counsel,6 and countless other issues.7 Empirical
studies have enriched our understanding of class action practice.8
Among class action observers and participants, the result of all
this attention has been a growing understanding of class actions'
advantages as well as their procedural and ethical pitfalls.
For denizens of the class action world, it is extraordinary to
think of the changes that have occurred in the past decade. A
decade ago, a settlement-only class action was a relatively new
phenomenon whose implications had not seriously been analyzed;
scholars and the Supreme Court had yet to grapple with the is-
sues raised by the Georgine9 asbestos settlement. Limited fund
' See, for example, John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort
Class Action, 95 Colum L Rev 1343 (1995); Susan Koniak, Feasting While the Widow
Weeps: Georgine v Amchem Prods, Inc, 80 Cornell L Rev 1045 (1995); Brian Wolfman and
Alan Morrison, Representing the Unrepresented in Class Actions Seeking Monetary Relief,
71 NYU L Rev 439 (1996).
' See for example, Bruce L. Hay and David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart" and "Black-
mail" Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 Notre Dame L Rev 1377
(2000); Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort Class
Action, 115 Harv L Rev 747 (2002); David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action:
The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 Harv L Rev 831 (2002).
6 See, for example, Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selec-
tion of Class Counsel By Auction, 102 Colum L Rev 650 (2002); Elliott J. Weiss and John
S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce
Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 Yale L J 2053 (1995); Symposium, Third
Circuit Task Force Report on Selection of Class Counsel, 74 Temple L Rev 685 (2001).
7 See, for example, John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit,
Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 Colum L Rev 370 (2000) (opt-out);
Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 Sup Ct
Rev 337 (class counsel incentives for good governance); Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in
Complex Litigation, 71 NYU L Rev 547 (1996) (choice of law); Henry Paul Monaghan,
Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98 Colum
L Rev 1148 (1998) (collateral attack based on inadequate representation); Judith Resnik,
Dennis Curtis and Deborah Hensler, Individuals Within the Aggregate: Relationships,
Representation, and Fees, 71 NYU L Rev 296 (1996) (fees); Marcel Kahan and Linda Sil-
berman, The Inadequate Search for "Adequacy" in Class Actions: A Critique of Epstein v
MCA, Inc, 73 NYU L Rev 765 (1998) (adequacy and preclusion); Patrick Woolley, Rethink-
ing the Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 Tex L Rev 571 (1997) (right of participa-
tion).
' See, for example, S. Elizabeth Gibson, Case Studies of Mass Tort Limited Fund
Class Action Settlements and Bankruptcy Reorganizations (Federal Judicial Center 2000);
Deborah R. Hensler et al, Class Action Dilemmas: Pursuing Public Goals for Private Gains
(RAND 1999); Laural Hooper and Marie Leary, Auctioning the Role of Class Counsel in
Class Action Cases: A Descriptive Study (Federal Judicial Center 2001); Jay H. Tidmarsh,
Mass Tort Settlement Class Actions: Five Case Studies (Federal Judicial Center 1998);
Thomas E. Willging et al, Empirical Study of Class Actions in Four Federal District
Courts: Final Report to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, (Federal Judicial Center
1996).
' Georgine v Amchem Products, 157 FRD 246 (ED Pa 1994) (granting injunction to
asbestos products manufacturers whose stipulation of proposed global settlement of claims
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mandatory class actions still seemed a viable option for a range of
cases; the Court's Ortiz ° decision was a long way off. Mass tort
class actions were on the rise, and the courts of appeals had yet to
render their decisions in Castano, Rhone-Poulenc,12 and other
mid-1990s mass tort decertifications calling attention to problems
of choice of law, mass tort maturity, future claimants, and intra-
class conflicts. The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules had begun
its work on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23 ("Rule 23") re-
forms, but had yet to publish its proposed amendments. 3 One
judge had begun to experiment with bidding processes for the
selection of class counsel,14 but the problems of such auctions had
yet to be addressed by the Third Circuit Task Force.1 5 Congress
had not yet enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act, 1 6 which would bring a new model of class counsel and class
representative selection to securities class actions. Commenta-
tors, courts, and policy-makers have fueled each other's interest
in increasingly nuanced class action issues. As a result, the com-
munity has grown significantly more sophisticated in its under-
standing and treatment of the class action device.
Why have class actions generated so much attention? The
usual answer is that class actions differ fundamentally from
other litigation and therefore raise special problems. Class ac-
tions differ from ordinary litigation in two critical respects. First,
class actions by definition are representative litigation; the
named parties represent others similarly situated.1 7 In this re-
spect, class actions constitute the great exception to the principle
that non-parties are not bound by a judgment.' 8 Second, the du-
by persons exposed to asbestos had been court approved, enjoining actions by individuals
who failed to timely opt out of class), revd, 83 F3d 610 (3d Cir 1996), affd as Amchem
Products, Inc v Windsor, 521 US 591 (1997).
,o Ortiz v Fibreboard Corp, 527 US 815 (1999).
Castano v American Tobacco, 84 F3d 734 (5th Cir 1996).
,2 In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc, 51 F3d 1293 (7th Cir 1995).
, Proposed Amendments to FRCP 23 (May 20, 2002); Proposed Amendments to
FRCP 23 (1996).
" See In re Oracle Securities Litigation, 131 FRD 688 (N D Cal 1990) (Walker) (hold-
ing that selection of class counsel and determination of counsel's compensation would be
made through competitive bidding to best further interest of class members).
Report of the Third Circuit Task Force on Selection of Class Counsel (2002).
,6 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"), 15 USC §78u-4(b)(2)
(2000).
17 See FRCP 23(a). In this regard, shareholder derivative suits and bankruptcy re-
semble class actions as representative litigation. (See text at notes 42-43).
"O This principle forms the underpinning of Pennoyer v Neff, 95 US 714 (1877), Hans-
berry v Lee 311 US 32 (1940), and Martin v Wilks, 490 US 755 (1989). It is no wonder that
most proceduralists view the line between class and non-class actions as fundamental.
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ties of class counsel run to the class as a whole, rather than to
individual class members.1 9
In the conventional explanation, class actions require special
safeguards because of the contrast between the position of absent
class members and that of ordinary litigants. Unlike absent class
members, each plaintiff in a non-class action has chosen to par-
ticipate in the suit and is named individually in the pleadings.
This is equally true whether the non-class litigation is an indi-
vidual lawsuit or a massive aggregation through party joinder, 20
consolidation,2' federal multidistrict litigation transfer,22 or state-
wide centralization.2 Moreover, each litigant in non-class litiga-
tion has an individual attorney-client relationship with a lawyer
whom that client retained.2 In non-class litigation, the explana-
tion goes, litigants and their lawyers make decisions about the
conduct of the litigation and the course of settlement negotia-
tions. In a class action, by contrast, class counsel pursues the liti-
gation in the best interests of the class as a whole, and absent
class members have virtually no role in litigation decisions.2 In
19 See, for example, Advisory Committee Note to Proposed Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 23(g)(1)(B) (May 20, 2002) ("Appointment as class counsel means that the primary
obligation of counsel is to the class rather than to any individual members of it."); In re
Agent Orange, 800 F2d 14, 18 (2d Cir 1986) (noting that class counsel's duty "runs to all
members of the class"); In re Corn Derivative Antitrust Litigation, 748 F2d 157, 163 (3d
Cir 1984) (Adams concurring) ("The obligation of counsel representing a class runs to the
class as a whole, although as a general matter class counsel may have worked closely on
with the named parties."); Parker v Anderson, 667 F2d 1204, 1211 (5th Cir 1982) ("The
compelling obligation of class counsel in class action litigation is to the group which makes
up the class. Counsel must be aware of and motivated by that which is in the maximum
best interests of the class considered as a unit.").
See FRCP 14 (third-party claims); FRCP 19 (compulsory party joinder); FRCP 20
(permissive party joinder); FRCP 24 (intervention).
21 See FRCP 42.
22 See 28 USC § 1407 (2000).
See, for example, Cal Civ Proc Code §404; NJ Ct R 4:38; Pa RCP 213 (consolida-
tion, severance, and transfer of actions and issues within a county), 213.1 (coordination of
actions in different counties).
24 With regard to the pro se litigant, this point could be rephrased in terms of the
litigant's client-attorney relationship with herself. The salient point is that in contrast to
class actions, where class counsel's duty runs to the class as a whole, the assumption in
non-class litigation is that each litigant has someone who takes responsibility for looking
after that litigant's individual interests.
The 2002 proposed amendments to Rule 23 reaffirm this traditional distinction
between the duties of class lawyers and individual lawyers. In connection with a new
provision on the duty of class counsel, the Advisory Committee notes explain that the
provision "recognizes that the primary responsibility of class counsel, resulting from ap-
pointment as class counsel, is to represent the best interests of the class. The rule thus
establishes the obligation of class counsel, an obligation that may be different from the
customary obligations of counsel to individual clients." Proposed FRCP 23(g)(1)(B) Advi-
sory Comm Note (May 20, 2002).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
theory, the client in non-class litigation can protect her own in-
terests by stating her objectives, monitoring her lawyer's conduct,
and above all, making her own decisions about whether and on
what terms to settle.6 In a class action, absent class members
lack the same ability to protect their own interests. Thus, class
actions provide a number of procedural safeguards, including ju-
dicial supervision of settlement and fees, as well as a requirement
of adequate representation: a court certifies the class only if the
court is satisfied that the class representatives and class counsel
will adequately represent the class as a whole.2
In sum, the traditional understanding of procedural joinder
devices draws a picture of class actions as collective representa-
tion fundamentally distinct from individual litigation or litigation
aggregated through non-class procedures. In a class action, nu-
merous plaintiffs depend upon the work of counsel with whom
they have no meaningful individual lawyer-client relationship,
over whom they have no meaningful control, and whose loyalty is
directed primarily to the interests of the group as a whole.
The traditional class action picture gets some things right. It
gets right the general description of class actions as litigation
over which most class members have no control. It also correctly
identifies the difference between class and non-class litigation at
the intersection of joinder and res judicata. In non-class litiga-
tion, the judgment binds only the named parties and their priv-
ies, whereas a class action judgment binds the entire class, except
those who have opted out. Importantly, the traditional under-
standing also correctly identifies why class actions require proce-
dural safeguards such as the adequate representation require-
ment and judicial supervision of settlement and fees: in class ac-
tions, class members may be bound despite their lack of control
over the litigation or any meaningful individual attorney-client
relationship.
To the extent it purports to draw a neat line between class
and non-class litigation, however, the traditional understanding
misses important aspects of what happens in modern, large-scale,
non-class litigation. The reality of class and non-class litigation is
messier than suggested by the theoretical distinction between
them. As a practical matter, given the way mass litigation has
developed over the past couple of decades, much litigation is han-
26 See Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(a).
27 See FRCP 23(a)(4). See also Hansberry, 311 US at 32.
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died through collective representation even if no class is certified.
By collective representation, I mean to describe non-class litiga-
tion that functions like class actions in the sense described above:
numerous plaintiffs depend upon the work of counsel with whom
they have no meaningful individual lawyer-client relationship,
over whom they have no meaningful control, and whose loyalty is
directed primarily to the interests of the group as a whole.
To engage in collective representation of this sort, counsel
organize in at least three ways. First, a single lawyer or law firm
may represent a large number of similarly situated clients,
whether in a massive action with permissively joined plaintiffs or
in a number of formally independent actions. Second, multiple
lawyers with similarly situated clients may work closely together,
either in a single action or in multiple actions informally aggre-
gated by the lawyers' coordinated efforts. Third, in litigation for-
mally aggregated by procedures such as multidistrict litigation
transfer and statewide consolidation, lead and liaison counsel and
steering committee members handle significant portions of the
work on behalf of the entire group of similarly situated clients.
Such mass collective representation raises a number of prob-
lems. One is the problem of inequitable settlement allocations
among members of the collectively represented group, without
the procedural safeguards of class actions. Lawyers representing
the mass of plaintiffs often have little or no incentive to allocate
settlements fairly among their clients, and may have incentives
to allocate settlements unfairly.
Non-class mass collective representation, moreover, seems to
invite muddled thinking among judges, clients, and lawyers. Too
many judges treat class action problems as though the alterna-
" An obvious difference between class actions and non-class litigation is the presence
of class representatives. In this regard, collective representation of the sort described in
this Article does not amount to "representative litigation" as that phrase applies to class
actions. Whether this difference matters depends upon the significance of class represen-
tatives to the conduct and outcome of the litigation. Compare PSLRA litigation, in which
class representatives may have a significant monitoring impact, with most other class
actions, in which class representatives provide little monitoring. On the empowered plain-
tiff model of the PSLRA, see Weiss and Beckerman, 104 Yale L J at 2053. On control of
class actions by counsel rather than class representatives, see Coffee, 100 Colum L Rev at
384 ("In the class action, the class representative is usually a token figure, with the class
counsel being the real party in interest."); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepre-
neurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U Chi
L Rev 877 (1987). See also Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' At-
torney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recom-
mendations for Reform, 58 U Chi L Rev 1 (1991) (proposing auction of class claims and use
of fictitious name class representatives).
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tive is autonomous individual litigation, when in fact the alterna-
tive is more likely to be some form of mass collective representa-
tion. Too many clients sign retainer agreements thinking that
they are signing up for individual representation over which they
have some meaningful control, when in fact they are signing up
for mass collective representation. And too many lawyers con-
vince themselves that their loyalty runs purely to each client in-
dividually, when in fact their litigation decisions aim-as they
often should-to advance the interests of the group as a whole.
Given the quantity and quality of commentary that class ac-
tions have generated, and the essential similarity between class
actions and much non-class litigation, it makes sense to take
some of the strongest ideas from the class action literature and
case law and examine whether those ideas can sensibly be ap-
plied to address some of these problems in non-class collective
representation. By viewing mass litigation practices in light of
class action concepts, we may better understand the procedural
and ethical dimensions of large-scale litigation practice. In par-
ticular, such an examination may help us understand certain
non-class litigation developments as efforts to erect the sort of
procedural and ethical safeguards that collective representation
requires. Mass litigation, whether or not certified as a class ac-
tion and, indeed, whether or not aggregated by any formal proce-
dural mechanism, tends toward de facto class litigation. It tends
toward class litigation in the sense that plaintiffs' outcomes de-
pend upon the work of lawyers who seek to maximize the aggre-
gate recovery, and with whom most plaintiffs have no meaningful
individual relationship.
Looking to class action concepts for guidance in non-class
mass litigation, we might consider a number of plausible applica-
tions. One direction might be to focus on the duties of class coun-
sel, and to explore the application of similar duties to steering
committee members, litigation group leaders, and other hub law-
yers in formally or informally aggregated litigation.' We might
also examine the related issue of whether written cooperation
agreements among lawyers in non-class litigation can replicate
"' I have explored elsewhere the duties of hub lawyers in informally aggregated liti-
gation, but left many questions unanswered. See Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggrega-
tion: Procedural and Ethical Implications of Coordination Among Counsel in Related
Lawsuits, 50 Duke L J 381 (2000). On the duty of hub lawyers to keep outlying lawyers
informed about the litigation, see Jack B. Weinstein, Individual Justice in Mass Tort
Litigation at 58 (Northwestern 1995).
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some of what is accomplished by the class certification procedure
in class actions. The class certification procedure requires puta-
tive class counsel to define the class they seek to represent. The
process of defining the class and seeking class certification can
help lawyers identify potential conflicts of interest, and spell out
their duty of loyalty, before embarking on representation of the
class. In non-class litigation in which lawyers for aligned parties
work together and share information, written cooperation agree-
ments can serve similar purposes, although without the judicial
oversight that the class certification procedure entails. °
Another direction might be to consider judicial approval of
class settlements and fees, and to evaluate whether the same
concerns that necessitate judicial approval of class settlements
and fees also suggest the need for judicial approval of certain
non-class settlements and fees in collective representation. Al-
though some judges actively manage the settlement process in
multi-district litigation ("MDL") and in other non-class mass liti-
gation, and thus maintain a supervisory role with regard to set-
tlement negotiations, judicial approval of settlements in non-class
litigation generally is not required as it is in class actions. Coun-
sel sometimes seek judicial approval of settlements in non-class
actions. For example, under some state contribution statutes, ju-
dicial approval of a settlement prevents contribution claims by co-
defendants. 1 The issue of whether judicial approval ought to take
on a greater role in mass settlements naturally invites examina-
tion of the class action experience."'
Yet another direction might be to examine recent develop-
ments in processes for selecting class counsel, to explore whether
similar approaches should be employed for selecting counsel for
steering committees and other leadership positions in non-class
mass litigation. Neither academic commentators nor policy-
makers have paid significant attention to processes for selecting
counsel to leadership positions in non-class litigation, despite the
tremendous importance of lead counsel and steering committees
30 See Erichson, 50 Duke L J at 468-69.
" See, for example, Cal Civ Proc Code §877.6(c) ("A determination by the court that
the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other tortfeasor or co-obligor from any
further claims against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative con-
tribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or com-
parative fault.").
' Compare Weinstein, Individual Justice at 74 ("Judges occasionally have audited
fees after settlement, and a few attorneys have made fee adjustments; a few judges have
exerted moral suasion to shift at least some of the benefits of bulk settlements to clients.").
527
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in guiding litigation aggregated by MDL or consolidation. By con-
trast, the past decade has seen a tremendous focus on the selec-
tion of class counsel. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995, by establishing a "rebuttable presumption ... that the
most adequate plaintiff ... is the person or persons that ... has
the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class, "3
permits institutional investors to control selection of class counsel
in securities class actions. The current set of proposed amend-
ments to Rule 23 include a new subsection concerning appoint-
ment of class counsel, which previously had not been addressed
explicitly in the Rule.3 Some judges have experimented with bid-
ding processes for selecting class counsel.35 One can imagine im-
porting certain class action concepts to assist judges in the ap-
pointment of counsel to leadership positions in MDL or other ag-
gregated litigation, particularly in trying to establish sound fee
incentives for efficient work by steering committee lawyers, and
in trying to achieve representation on the steering committee of
different "subclasses."3
Application of these ideas depends, to some extent, on the
type of aggregation. For mass litigation aggregated by a single
lawyer or firm representing many plaintiffs, the most promising
topics involve attorney loyalty and conflicts of interest, as well as
judicial supervision of settlement and fees. For litigation aggre-
gated informally by the coordinated efforts of multiple firms,
promising topics include not only conflicts of interest and judicial
supervision, but also the duties of hub lawyers. For litigation ag-
gregated by the formal mechanisms of joinder, consolidation, or
multidistrict litigation transfer, promising topics include the du-
15 USC §78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i) and (iii)(1) (2000).
See Proposed FRCP 23(g) (May 20, 2002). The Advisory Committee Note explains
that the rule "responds to the reality that the selection and activity of class counsel are
often critically important to the successful handling of a class action."
See, for example, Oracle Securities Litigation, 131 FRD at 688; Cendant Corp Liti-
gation, 191 FRD at 387 (choosing lowest qualified bidder to represent plaintiffs as lead
counsel); In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litigation, 197 FRD 71 (S D NY 2000) (holding
that auction was appropriate method for selecting lead class counsel after class certifica-
tion). See also Report of the Third Circuit Task Force on Selection of Class Counsel (2002).
36 See Manual For Complex Litigation Third § 20.224 at 30 (Federal Judicial Center
1995) ("The court should also ensure that designated counsel fairly represent the various
interests in the litigation; where diverse interests exist among the parties, the court may
designate a committee of counsel representing different interests."); Stephen A. Sheller,
Court Appointed MDL Counsel: Who They Represent and Who They Should Represent, 3
Mealey Litig Rep: Fen-Phen/Redux 22 (Dec 1999) (emphasizing importance of representa-
tiveness in the appointment of MDL plaintiffs' steering committees).
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ties of hub lawyers, judicial supervision of settlement and fees,
and also the selection of counsel for leadership positions.
This Article describes forms of non-class mass litigation to
show their functional resemblance to class actions. It then pur-
sues the most promising application of the idea of importing class
action concepts for use in non-class litigation. It considers the
relinquishment of client autonomy in non-class group representa-
tion in light of developments in the class action requirements of
notice and opt-out.
Class action notice and opt-out, as shaped by recent class
action developments including the pending Rule 23 amendments,
offer insight into the proper handling of collective representation
in non-class cases. As in a class action, plaintiffs in collective rep-
resentation relinquish most of their control over the litigation.
Relinquishing autonomy is a perfectly rational decision for many
plaintiffs, given the potential advantages of group representation.
Class action developments, however, emphasize the importance
of recognizing the relinquishment of autonomy in the conduct of
litigation and settlement negotiations, and substituting opportu-
nities for autonomous decision-making at the two most critical
moments-the outset of collective representation, and the accep-
tance or rejection of a settlement.
In non-class litigation, we can accomplish the same objectives
by looking to lawyers' professional obligations concerning con-
flicts of interest and aggregate settlements. Applying the rules of
professional conduct in light of the commonalities between class
actions and non-class collective representation, lawyers can cre-
ate opportunities for autonomous client decisions at the outset
and at settlement, as a substitute for client autonomy in the
course of litigation and negotiation.
Once clients have opted for the benefits of collective repre-
sentation, their lawyer should seek primarily to advance the in-
terests of the group, as in a class action. The lawyer's duty of loy-
alty runs to each individual client, but in group representation,
the lawyer fulfills that duty of loyalty by focusing first and fore-
most on collective interests. If clients are adequately informed at
the outset that the lawyer will seek to advance the interests of
the aggregate, and are advised of the benefits and risks of par-
ticipating in such group representation, as well as the conflicts of
interest that may arise, then clients may choose whether they
wish to participate. With such informed consent at the outset,
and with the added protection of informed consent to settlement
529
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at the back end, client autonomy is adequately protected despite
the relinquishment of client control over the conduct of litigation
and negotiation. Thus, clients represented collectively, like class
members, may enjoy opportunities for autonomous decision mak-
ing on participation in the litigation and acceptance of a settle-
ment, without unduly burdening the lawyer's litigation and nego-
tiation on behalf of the group.
I. NON-CLASS COLLECTIVE REPRESENTATION
Class actions are representative litigation by virtue of the
presence of class representatives, the named plaintiffs,37 who liti-
gate on behalf of all others similarly situated.' As a practical
matter, however, the defining aspect of class actions as represen-
tative litigation is that class counsel seeks to advance the inter-
ests of the class as a group, and individual class members have
little control over the litigation or the course of settlement nego-
tiations. It is in this latter sense that much non-class litigation
can be understood as functioning like class actions.
This Part describes several ways in which non-class mass
litigation comes to resemble class actions. As described earlier,
my interest is in non-class litigation that functions like class ac-
tions in the sense that numerous plaintiffs depend upon the work
of counsel with whom they have no meaningful individual lawyer-
client relationship, over whom they have no meaningful control,
and whose loyalty is directed primarily to the interests of the
group as a whole.39 Mass representation by a single lawyer or
firm, in this regard, bears a striking resemblance to class action
practice. 4° Coordinated mass litigation by multiple firms presents
"7 Defendant class actions are permitted by Rule 23(a), and are certified on rare
occasion. See, for example, In re Integra Realty Resources, Inc, 262 F3d 1089 (10th Cir.
2001) (upholding district court's certification of defendant class); Monaco v Stone, 187 FRD
50 (EDNY 1999) (holding certification of particular defendant class was appropriate). This
paper, however, considers only plaintiff class actions, which are far more common and
offer a better foil for understanding mass non-class litigation. Although mass litigation
sometimes involves hundreds of defendants, and defense lawyers often coordinate their
efforts through joint defense agreements, the mass collective representations that resem-
ble class actions occur almost exclusively on the plaintiff side.
See FRCP 23(a) ("One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as represen-
tative parties on behalf of all.").
9 See note 28.
40 Richard Nagareda, in his analysis of the fen-phen settlement class action, empha-
sizes the difference between non-class mass tort settlements and class action settlements
while acknowledging the lack of client control in either setting: "A mass tort plaintiffs'
attorney might well identify and recruit the client, and in practice there may be little or no
supervision of plaintiffs' counsel by the client. But neither of these practical realities shat-
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a weaker case of de facto class action, but bears the hallmarks of
collective representation in inherent conflicts of interest and at-
tenuated attorney-client relationships.
In thinking about non-class collective representation, it may
be useful to consider the wide range of categories of representa-
tive or group litigation. First, the class action is the archetype of
representative litigation. As representative litigation, class ac-
tions raise a host of procedural and ethical problems, but many of
those problems are diagnosable because they inhere in the very
definition of class litigation. Safeguards addressing some of the
problems of representative litigation are built into class action
procedure. Second, shareholder derivative suits are explicitly rep-
resentative litigation. Indeed, the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure recognize the connection between class actions and deriva-
tive suits by addressing the latter in Rule 23.1.41 Third, bank-
ruptcy operates as representative litigation. In Chapter 11 reor-
ganizations, claimants' interests are represented by creditors'
committees and others, and the discharge has the effect of bind-
ing non-parties. Fourth, certain government lawsuits function as
representative litigation, particularly parens patriae lawsuits and
recoupment actions against tortfeasors. Fifth, public interest im-
pact litigation often takes the form of an individual lawsuit seek-
ing injunctive relief that will benefit an entire class of persons,
without formally pursuing the litigation as a class action. Sixth,
formally aggregated mass litigation, such as federal court litiga-
tion transferred for consolidated pretrial handling pursuant to
the multidistrict litigation statute,42 or state court actions con-
solidated on a statewide basis, can function as representative or
group litigation. Although non-class formal aggregation, in the-
ory, can gather claims in which each plaintiff is represented by
counsel on an individual basis, much of the work in practice is
performed by lawyers on the MDL steering committees or in
other leadership positions. The dominant role of hub lawyers in
MDL and statewide consolidations results in de facto group rep-
ters the consensual nature of the attorney-client relationship. For present purposes, the
point is simply that this underlying notion of consent, rooted in client autonomy, is what
gives aggregate settlements their legitimacy." Nagareda, 115 Harv L Rev at 768. While
my central point, in contrast to Nagareda's, is to deemphasize the difference between class
and non-class mass settlements, I share his understanding that aggregate settlements
derive their legitimacy from client autonomy.
41 Rule 23.1 provides the procedural requirements for derivative suits by one or more
shareholders.
42 28 USC § 1407 (2000).
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resentation. Seventh, a single lawyer or firm that represents
massive numbers of plaintiffs with related claims tends in prac-
tice to represent the plaintiffs on a group basis, whether the cli-
ents' claims are filed separately or joined in a single action.
Eighth, counsel coordination among lawyers handling related but
judicially separate lawsuits results in informal aggregation of the
claims and de facto group representation. For purposes of this
paper, these last two categories are the most interesting but also
the most problematic. It is difficult to define collective represen-
tation in a way that provides a line between aggregated and
unaggregated litigation once we venture into litigation aggre-
gated on an informal basis rather than pursuant to class action,
joinder, consolidation, or other formal procedural mechanisms.4
A. Collective Representation by a Single Firm
In mass litigation, it has become common for a single lawyer
or firm to represent hundreds or thousands of similarly situated
clients. Each client signs an individual retainer agreement with
the lawyer. In this sense, the picture looks very different from a
class action, in which a lawyer represents many similarly situ-
ated persons as members of the class, but in which the bulk of the
class members did not individually retain the lawyer.
Litigation pursued by a lawyer on behalf of a large number of
similarly situated clients may take various non-class procedural
forms. The lawyer may file the claims jointly in a single action as
a matter of permissive party joinder if the claims arise out of the
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occur-
rences.4 If the lawyer initially files the claims as separate law-
suits, they may nonetheless be formally aggregated through fed-
eral consolidation,' statewide consolidation,4 or federal multidis-
trict litigation.4 Alternatively, the claims may go forward as hun-
dreds or thousands of formally separate lawsuits.
". I have written elsewhere on some of these categories of collective litigation. On
coordination among counsel as a form of aggregation, and on a single firm's accumulation
of related claims as a similar form of aggregation, see Erichson, 50 Duke L J at 386-401.
On class actions and government lawsuits as types of representative litigation driven by
different incentives, duties, and mindsets, see Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Ac-
tions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco, and the Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering
in Mass Litigation, 34 UC Davis L Rev 1, 23-27 (2000).
" See FRCP 20(a) (permissive joinder).
See FRCP 42(a) (consolidation).
46 See, for example, Cal Civ Proc Code §404; NJ Ct R 4:38; Pa RCP 213, 213.1.
4' See 28 USC § 1407.
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These matters of procedural form have less impact on the
lawyer's handling of the litigation than one might expect. Regard-
less of whether plaintiffs' claims are formally aggregated, the
lawyer representing many similarly situated clients necessarily
handles the litigation on a group basis. In preparing pleadings,
conducting discovery, retaining experts, preparing for trial, and
negotiating settlement, the lawyer addresses the plaintiffs' claims
primarily as a group. A lawyer who simultaneously represents
hundreds or thousands of similarly situated plaintiffs does not
have significant personal involvement with each client, and does
not engage each client in the sort of consultation over the conduct
of litigation envisioned by traditional principles of professional
responsibility.8
Collective representation most resembles a class action when
the group lawyer negotiates a settlement en masse. Handling
litigation on a group basis may or may not result in such a group
settlement. Even if all of the claims settle, those settlements may
be negotiated on a plaintiff-by-plaintiff basis and presented inde-
pendently to each client, particularly if the claims involve high
stakes and if individual differences significantly affect valuation.
In many cases, however, lawyers with large numbers of related
claims negotiate settlement of those claims either as an entire
group or in bundles.
Such aggregate settlements vary tremendously. It may be
useful to think of a typology of block settlements along two axes:
allocation and conditionality. In terms of allocation of settlement
funds, block settlements fall into four categories. First, a settle-
ment may provide for a lump sum payment by the defendant,
leaving the allocation of that lump sum to the plaintiffs, their
lawyer, or a third party.49 Second, a settlement may establish a
" See Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(a) ('A lawyer shall abide by a client's
decisions concerning the objectives of representation .... and shall consult with the client
as to the means by which they are to be pursued."); See also Model Code of Professional
Responsibility EC 7-7 ('In certain areas of legal representation not affecting the merits of
the cause. . ., a lawyer is entitled to make decisions on his own. But otherwise the author-
ity to make decisions is exclusively that of the client .. "). In saying that mass litigators
do not engage each client in such consultation, I mean this as a descriptive account of
mass litigation practice, not as a normative criticism of lawyers for treating clients as a
group rather than as individuals. Indeed, as discussed in Part II A, lawyers representing
large groups in mass litigation ought to strive to maximize the interests of the group as a
whole.
" In the diet drugs tort litigation, American Home Products has settled large bun-
dles of claims on a lump-sum basis. See, for example, Mark Hamblett, New York Firm
Accused of Intimidating Clients in Fen-Phen Litigation, NY L J 1 (Dec 12, 2001) (discuss-
ing lawsuit arising from a law firm's lump-sum settlement of over five thousand claims
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formula or matrix for determining payments based on factors
such as disease category and age, with a process for administer-
ing claims under the settlement.' Third, a settlement may pro-
vide for a fixed per-plaintiff amount of compensation. 5 Fourth, a
settlement may allocate specific amounts for each plaintiff.
On the axis of conditionality, block settlements divide into at
least three levels. In an all-or-nothing package deal, the defen-
dant's settlement offer to each plaintiff is conditioned on accep-
tance by every other plaintiff in the group. In the same vein but
more moderate, a settlement with a walk-away provision gives
the defendant the right to abandon the settlement if more than a
certain percentage of plaintiffs decline their offers.52 As a varia-
tion halfway between all-or-nothing and walk-away provisions,
tiered settlement agreements permit a defendant to withdraw
unless the settlement is accepted by, for example, 100 percent of
the most serious category of claimants and 90 percent of the re-
mainder. Finally, settlement offers can be independent in the
sense that each plaintiff is free to accept or reject the offer indi-
vidually. A settlement with plaintiff-specific amounts, not condi-
tioned on acceptance of other's settlements, is the only combina-
tion that amounts to truly individual settlements. Every other
combination constitutes some form of collective settlement, in its
economic underpinnings if not in its legal effect.
How does mass litigation come to be concentrated in the
hands of relatively few plaintiffs' lawyers? The group of plaintiffs'
lawyers handling mass litigation appears to be growing, most
likely as a result of the increasing monetary success of mass tort
suits and the advent of internet advertising and networking, but
still mass litigation tends to be handled by lawyers with large
after plaintiffs had opted out of a nationwide class settlement). See also David J. Morrow,
American Home to Settle Some 1,400 Fen-Phen Suits, NY Times C2 (Dec 23, 1999) (report-
ing $350 million settlement of Mississippi claims prior to approval of the class settlement);
Brenda Sapino Jeffreys, Stick to the Trial Plan, Texas Lawyer 19 (Jan 31, 2000) (reporting
that Houston plaintiffs' lawyer Michael Gallagher settled the fen-phen claims of 1200
clients for a reported $350-500 million, hours after winning a huge verdict for five plain-
tiffs in a Mississippi fen-phen trial).
'o See Paul D. Rheingold, How to Settle Your Inventory of Mass Tort Cases Ethically,
ATLA Annual Convention Reference Materials 475, 478 (July 2002) (describing a "three-
step grid" method for settling a large inventory of claims, and noting that this method
"has been used by many firms, mine included").
' A recent example is the settlement of over thirty thousand Norplant product liabil-
ity claims by Wyeth Pharmaceuticals for $1,500 each. See Andrew Harris, Ruling Finishes
OffNorplant Suits, Nat] L J B6 (Sept 30, 2002).
" See Rheingold, ATLA Annual Convention Reference Materials at 475, 478 (cited in
note 50) (noting that an acceptance percentage of 90 percent has been used).
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numbers of similarly situated clients. Mass litigators accumulate
plaintiffs either directly or by referral, due to a combination of
reputation, marketing, and referral networks.
In mass litigation, the internet has become an important me-
dium for attracting clients, along with television and radio adver-
tisements. Internet advertising enables both established plain-
tiffs' firms and new entrants to attract mass litigation clients.
The medium is perfectly suited to the job of gathering massive
numbers of similarly situated persons. Law firms set up websites
aimed at attracting clients for specific litigation.0 For lawyers
hoping to attract a sufficient number of similar clients to achieve
the critical mass needed for mass representation, earlier forms of
lawyer advertising would have been inefficient and prohibitively
expensive. Internet advertising, especially web-based consortium
advertising services that attract potential clients with particular
types of injuries or claims and connect those potential clients
with lawyers in their home states," enables small and less estab-
lished firms to seek entry into mass litigation practice.
The referral market has fueled the growth of non-class collec-
tive representation. Stephen Yeazell has written of this phe-
* An internet search on "ephedra," "Firestone tires," "Baycol," or any other tort du
jour reveals heaps of law firms offering their services. A potential fen-phen plaintiff
searching the web for a lawyer would quickly find hundreds of sites, with such topical
domain names as <fenpheninformation.com>, <fen-phen-settlements.com>, <fen-phen-
legal-resources.com>, <fen-pheninjurylaw.com>, <fen-phen-injury.com>, <fenphencen-
tral.com>, and even <afenphenattorneyforyou.com> (visited Aug 12, 2003). The sites' law
firm sponsors range from very small firms to large, established ones. Fen-phen-legal-
resources.com belongs to Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, a San Francisco-
based firm that is among the dominant class action practices in the country. See
<http://www.fen-phen-legal-resources.com> (visited Aug 12, 2003). Others, including
afenphenattorneyforyou.com, operate as consortium advertising sites, attracting potential
clients nationwide based on the type of injury or claim and connecting the clients to attor-
neys in the clients' home states. See <http://www.afenphenattorneyforyou.com> (visited
Aug 12, 2003).
' One such site promises a steady flow of clients to meet a firm's specific interests:
"Join an advertising consortium of lawyers and law firms that market together on Big-
ClassAction.com .... [W]e guarantee a steady flow of mass tort, class action, personal
injury, discrimination, and employment leads based entirely on your specific interests."
See <http://www.bigclassaction.com/newsletters/063002.html> (visited Sept 19, 2003).
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the extent and aggressiveness of lawyer advertising for
mass litigation plaintiffs has drawn criticism from the better established segment of the
plaintiffs' bar. See Paul D. Rheingold, Excess in Mass Tort Litigation, 2-16 Mealey Litig
Rep Class Actions 29 (2002). The dispute echoes an earlier generation's dispute over the
ethics and constitutionality of lawyer advertising in general. Until twenty-five years ago,
when the Supreme Court held lawyer advertising to be commercial speech protected by
the First Amendment, established law firms and the American Bar Association resisted
any attempt by lawyers to advertise for clients. See Bates v State Bar of Arizona, 433 US
350, 365 (1977).
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nomenon in historical context, and notes that "[tihe plaintiffs'
bar, with its system of referrals, is achieving transactionally the
kinds of specialization and breadth that the corporate bar is
achieving by growth in firm size."5 Ethical constraints on fee
sharing generally require fee-splitting lawyers to divide fees in
proportion to the work or to assume joint responsibility,57 but
these rules have not significantly hampered the market in refer-
ral of clients. Rather, they promote a hub-and-spoke structure in
which referring lawyers remain involved in a limited capacity in
their clients' cases, serving as the primary client contact, while
the lawyer to whom the cases are referred performs the bulk of
the work in litigation and negotiation.5 Litigation based on such
referral networks comes to resemble class actions in which indi-
vidually retained plaintiffs' attorneys remain on the sidelines
while lawyers for the class conduct the litigation.
Increasingly, law firms engaged in mass plaintiffs' practice
market themselves to referring lawyers. 59 It is, in essence, a win-
win-win pitch: Refer your clients to us because we have the re-
sources and leverage to maximize their recovery, and thereby to
maximize your referral fee, so your clients win, we win, and you
win.w Television and radio advertising combines with the referral
Stephen C. Yeazell, Re-Financing Civil Litigation, 51 DePaul L Rev 183, 202
(2001).
"' See Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(e) (permitting referral fees or other fee
division among lawyers if the client is advised and does not object, the total fee is reason-
able, and the fee sharing is proportional to services rendered by each lawyer "or, by writ-
ten agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the represen-
tation"). See also Restatement (Third), The Law Governing Lawyers §47 (2000) (address-
ing fee-splitting of lawyers in different firms). Not all states follow the model rule, how-
ever. Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 1.04 permits referring lawyers to
collect fees without assuming joint responsibility; the Texas referral market is particularly
robust. See Nathan Koppel, Referrals Get Rough Around the Edges, Tex Lawyer 1 (March
29, 1999).
" See Nathan Koppel, Referrals Pay Off, Tex Lawyer 36 (March 29, 1999) (describing
the huge referral fees won by a lawyer who advertised for breast implant clients and then
referred the clients to better-established firms, and noting that "she remained involved in
all the cases in a limited capacity, acting as a liaison between the clients and handling
attorneys").
' See Yeazell, 51 DePaul L Rev at 203 (cited in note 56) ("Unlike the defense bar,
then, the plaintiffs' bar is marketing as much to other lawyers as it is to clients.").
' One website, for example, touts the firm's resources and promises to treat referring
lawyers fairly: "Referring attorneys will be able to match the leverage and financial re-
sources of big corporate firms to successfully advocate the interests of their clients, while
receiving fair and equitable treatment. For both consumers and their legal representa-
tives, HermanMathis is solidly committed to one goal: justice for all." Website of Herman,
Mathis, Casey, Kitchens & Gerel, LLP, <http://www.hermanmathis'com/main.htm> (vis-
ited Aug 12, 2003).
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market to create an intake system in which potential plaintiffs
initially contact lawyers who direct their marketing to the public,
and those lawyers in turn refer the clients to lawyers who direct
their marketing to other lawyers for referrals. 6 As plaintiffs' law-
yers have pursued increasingly aggressive marketing aimed at
the accumulation and referral of mass tort clients, referral prac-
tices have begun to raise eyebrows. Some worry that referrals do
not effectively channel cases to the best-equipped lawyers.6 Some
plaintiffs' lawyers themselves criticize what they see as excessive
and unethical advertising and referral practices among their col-
leagues.63 According to one lawyer who has represented a number
of plaintiffs in the diet drugs mass tort litigation:
There are lawyers in diet pills ... who as a function of ad-
vertising and the really pernicious referral systems that
exist among and between these people who advertise on
television and funnel literally thousands of cases to some
guy because the guy will split the fees 50/50, a referral fee
that's totally unbelievable and of questionable ethics-
they will send cases to people who never saw a document,
have never in their lives tried a case to jury verdict, [and]
were simply made powerful because they had a thousand
cases.64
No doubt, advertising and referral systems can be abused,
and in the worst-case scenario, they can channel cases to incom-
petent or unscrupulous lawyers who excel in marketing but fail
at litigation. In general, however, it is reasonable to expect that
the incentives of the referral market would generally channel re-
6 See Mark Ballard, Coming to Terms with the $20,000Ad, Natl L J Al (Oct 7, 2002)
("Television advertising's success in bringing in new clients, coupled with a sharp increase
in the use of the mass tort strategy has created an alliance between trial lawyers and the
marketing attorneys they derided only a few years ago. Many of the television lawyers,
with their production and intake capabilities already in place, have begun trolling for
clients to refer to allied trial lawyers.").
See Koppel, Tex Lawyer at 1 (cited in note 57) ("The idea behind a freewheeling,
free-market referral system is to channel cases, usually complex plaintiffs cases, from the
hands of lawyers too inexperienced or otherwise ill-equipped to handle them into the right
hands .... That still happens, of course. But lawyers in the middle of the increasingly
rough-and-tumble referral market say a new model has arisen. Many lawyers now use
mass advertising to dredge in and sign up clients just to refer them out en masse-even
shopping them to the highest bidder.").
See, for example, Rheingold, 2-16 Mealey Litig Rep Class Actions at 29-30 (cited
in note 55) (criticizing "lawyers [who] became merchants and ran ads for cases they had no
intention of handling themselves").
" Interview with Alex H. MacDonald, Esq. (April 26, 2002) ("MacDonald Interview").
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ferral cases to lawyers competent to handle them and positioned
to take advantage of economies of scale and opportunities for bar-
gaining leverage.65
Whether by marketing, publicity, referrals, or otherwise,
firms have found niches and gathered large numbers of clients
with related claims. Non-class mass representation of clients by a
single firm has become commonplace in a wide variety of mass
litigation. Examples include the representation of 349 homeown-
ers in a deceptive trade practices action against a builder' and
the representation of hundreds of personal injury clients for
claims arising out of an explosion at a chemical plant. In some
cases, non-class mass representation strongly resembles class
actions in the way the lawyers conduct the litigation. In a securi-
ties action, for example, a single firm representing over two hun-
dred plaintiffs filed a single complaint on behalf of all the plain-
tiffs, and empowered a steering committee of "representative
plaintiffs" to make decisions on behalf of the group.68
Firms have structured their businesses to enhance their abil-
ity to represent massive numbers of plaintiffs collectively. Five
plaintiffs' firms from around the country, for example, recently
formed a "law firm of law firms" under the name Herman,
Mathis, Casey, Kitchens & Gerel, LLP ("HermanMathis"). The
firms did not merge. Rather, each firm remained intact as a sepa-
rate law firm, but they created in addition a partnership in which
the Class A partners are the five plaintiffs' firms.69 Before any of
the individual firms may become involved in a monumental
case-defined as a case involving at least $500 million in dam-
ages-the case must be presented to HermanMathis. ° Essen-
tially, the structure gives the megafirm a right of first refusal on
very large cases.7 The firm markets itself for its ability to handle
litigation on a massive nationwide scale.72 Rather than organizing
6' See Yeazell, 51 DePaul L Rev at 201-03 (cited in note 56).
See Quintero v Jim Walter Homes, Inc, 709 SW2d 225 (Tex App 1985).
17 See Arce v Burrow, 958 SW2d 239 (Tex App 1997).
See Abbott v Kidder Peabody & Co, 42 F Supp 2d 1046 (D Colo 1999).
69 Interview with Russ Herman, Esq. (Jan 6, 2002) ("Herman Interview").
70 Id.
71 Id.
7' The firm's website emphasizes the ability to match defendants' power by litigating
on a massive scale and combining the resources of the five member firms: "The mission of
HermanMathis is to bring to bear the same quality, leverage and resources of big corpo-
rate law firms to defend the interests of our clients." Available online at
<http://www.hermanmathis.com/about.htm> (visited Aug 12, 2003). The website describes
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an ad hoc group for a particular litigation, as Wendell Gauthierdid in gathering the Castano group to pursue a nationwide to-bacco class action, 73 HermanMathis provides a structure for re-
source-pooling that is in place and prepared for the next mass
litigation opportunity when it arises.74
By marketing to targeted potential plaintiffs for specific masslitigation, by building a strong referral market, and by structur-
ing law firms to facilitate mass representation, plaintiffs' firms
have established mass collective representation as a form of ag-gregation unto itself, but with a powerful resemblance to class
actions.
B. Collective Representation by Multiple Firms
Compared to mass representation by a single lawyer or firm,
cooperative representation by multiple firms presents a weaker
case for treatment as a de facto class action. Nevertheless, coun-
sel coordination can present similar opportunities for economies
of scale, investment for high stakes, and bargaining leverage.Counsel coordination also entails similar relinquishment of client
autonomy. Through the coordinated work of multiple firms,
whether in formally aggregated or formally separate lawsuits,plaintiffs in mass litigation may find themselves relying on the
work of counsel with whom they have no lawyer-client relation-
ship, over whom they have no control, and whose loyalty is di-
rected toward collective interests. Thus, while a weaker form of
collective litigation than mass representation by a single firm,
the firm's network of alliances in terms that sound remarkably similar to the organization
of a nationwide defense team for a large corporate defendant:Whether the defendants in your lawsuit are in Fairfax, Virginia, or Fair-banks, Alaska, it's good to know you can rely on the nationwide resourcesof HermanMathis and our strategic alliances with prominent law firmsfrom coast-to-coast. To better serve you, HermanMathis has organized anationwide strategic alliance network of more than 20 law firms to workcooperatively with us on litigation. They are our Permanent Co-Counselin their respective states, serving as the firm's on-site representatives inthe event your litigation requires local counsel, in addition to the 13HermanMathis offices in seven states and the District of Columbia. ...With the full breadth of these remarkable resources, HermanMathis iscommitted to go the distance in protecting your rights. Anytime. Any-
where.
<http://www.hermanmathis'con/about-alliances.htm> (visited Aug 12, 2003).
"3 Peter Pringle, Cornered: Big Tobacco at the Bar of Justice 42-51 (Henry Holt
1998).
" Herman Interview (cited in note 64).
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collective representation by counsel coordination among multiple
firms warrants attention.
1. Counsel coordination in formally aggregated litigation.
The proposition that mass litigation practice deprives most
plaintiffs of meaningful control over the conduct of their litigation
is no longer particularly controversial or surprising to most prac-
titioners, judges, and commentators familiar with mass litigation.
One aspect of this phenomenon that remains interesting, how-
ever, is the similarity in practice between litigation forms that
differ in theory. Certain litigation that remains judicially sepa-
rate comes to resemble formally aggregated litigation. Similarly,
litigation aggregated by non-class procedural mechanisms comes
to resemble class actions, whether through joint representation
by a single firm 5 or by coordination among lawyers within the
aggregated litigation.76
Procedural rules and statutes provide a number of mecha-
nisms by which related claims by multiple plaintiffs can be ag-
gregated. Plaintiffs may file their claims jointly in a single action
pursuant to rules on permissive party joinder.77 Actions filed
separately, but involving common questions, may be consolidated
for purposes of pretrial, trial, or both.78 Some state court systems
provide for statewide consolidation or centralization of related
claims. 79 Related actions pending in multiple federal district
courts may be transferred to a single district for consolidated pre-
trial handling pursuant to the MDL. s°
In theory, the procedural mechanisms of party joinder, con-
solidation, and MDL function differently from class actions.
These aggregation procedures do not purport to create represen-
tative litigation or to impose on lawyers a duty to represent client
interests on a group-wide rather than an individual basis. In
practice, however, when these formal aggregation processes are
used on a massive scale, the litigation comes to resemble a class
action in the sense that hub lawyers conduct important work in
71 See Part I A.
7 See Part I B 2.
See FRCP 20(a).
See FRCP 42(a).
See, for example, Cal Code Civ Proc §404; NJ Ct R 4:38; Pa RCP 213, 213.1. See
also Paul D. Rheingold, Prospects for Managing Mass Tort Litigation in the State Courts,
31 Seton Hall L Rev 910, 911-13 (2001).
" See 28 USC § 1407.
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the litigation on behalf of a large group of clients, many of whom
have little or no relationship with those lawyers.
Hub lawyers include members of steering committees, as well
as lead and liaison counsel. In cases involving massive party
joinder or consolidation, courts often require parties to act
through lead counsel . In federal MDL, the lawyers on the plain-
tiffs' steering committee, discovery committee, and similar posi-
tions generally dominate the conduct of pretrial litigation, and
sometimes settlement negotiations as well.
The Continental Grain elevator explosion litigation 82 presents
an early example of resource pooling by plaintiffs' lawyers in
MDL to match the resources invested in the litigation by defen-
dants. "Voluntarily, the lawyers in that case got together," ex-
plains Russ Herman, one of the lead lawyers." "We all under-
stood that we were going to be facing well-financed national as
well as local law firms."8 Approximately forty plaintiffs' lawyers
coordinated their efforts and pooled their resources to handle the
Continental Grain litigation. Herman explains the importance of
resource pooling: "All of this takes a terrific amount of resources
and single-mindedness. The resources you need are lawyers and
law firms who can be both leaders and followers at the same
time, who have developed some areas of expertise, who have the
backup in their own firms where they can focus and dedicate
themselves with tenacity to more or less a single case. And the
money-very, very important-you can't do this without a big
economic engine.""' Although the Continental Grain litigation
was not certified as a class action, the lawyers handled it on a
group basis, contributing funds and carrying expenses with the
expectation of dividing fees at the end if the case was concluded
successfully. In Herman's words, "This case was essentially han-
dled as a class action without its being classed.""
81 See Daniel Wise, Lawyers Pack World Trade Center Hearing, 211 NY L J 1 (1994)
(describing judge's insistence on counsel coordination in litigation arising out of the 1993
bombing of the World Trade Center). Indeed, class action cases addressing the numerosity
requirement of Rule 23(a)(1) recognize that with a large enough number of parties, joinder
comes to resemble a class action. See, for example, Alexander Grant & Co v McAlister, 116
FRD 583, 587 (SD Ohio 1987); In re Gap Stores Securities Litigation, 79 FRD 283, 289 (ND
Cal 1978).
' In re Continental Grain Co, Inc Disaster at Westwego, Louisiana, on December 22,
1977, 482 F Supp 330 (JPMDL 1979).
Herman Interview (cited in note 69).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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State court aggregation, too, provides opportunities for mass
collective representation. In the polybutylene pipe product liabil-
ity litigation in Texas state court, forty-nine law firms coordi-
nated in representing over thirty-seven thousand plaintiffs, with
a single firm acting as lead counsel.87 Mass litigators understand
that much collective litigation, in both federal and state courts,
occurs by procedural mechanisms other than class actions."
2. Counsel coordination in informally aggregated litigation.
Even in the absence of formal aggregation, related claims
may be informally aggregated by the coordinated efforts of coun-
sel.89 Despite their lone-wolf reputation and famously entrepre-
neurial nature, plaintiffs' lawyers have learned the value of coop-
eration. Just as they organize to work collectively in MDL and
other formally aggregated litigation, so do they organize to gain
advantages when pursuing separate but related lawsuits. By
working with other lawyers representing similarly situated cli-
ents, plaintiffs' lawyers achieve some of the benefits of class liti-
gation. Scale economies result from the sharing of information
and divvying up of work among coordinating lawyers. The pooling
of resources permits greater investment in the litigation. To the
extent lawyers coordinate their negotiation efforts, enhanced bar-
gaining leverage may result as well.
Often, coordination among plaintiffs' lawyers occurs under
the auspices of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America
("ATLA"), which sponsors over sixty litigation groups for lawyers
working on specific types of lawsuits.' The litigation groups, ac-
cording to ATLA's literature, "provide a network for ATLA mem-
87 See In re Polybutylene Plumbing Litigation, 23 SW3d 428 (Tex App 2000). The
plaintiffs owned property with allegedly defective plumbing systems. Id at 432-33. The
actions were initially brought as separate product liability actions against the providers of
materials for the plumbing systems, but were consolidated for discovery and pretrial pur-
poses with the firm of Fleming, Hovenkamp & Grayson as lead counsel. Id.
One plaintiffs' law firm's website makes this point for prospective clients: "These
mass tort cases are typically congregated in some fashion. One method is the use of class
action, where a few named plaintiffs sue on behalf of all those injured. A class action is not
necessarily the best way to organize litigation and spread costs, and therefore our firm is
involved in many other means of congregation." <http://www.rheingoldlaw.com/whatAre.
html> (visited Aug 12, 2003).
' For an extensive discussion of the phenomenon of informal aggregation, see Erich-
son, 50 Duke L J at 381 (cited in note 29).
See Litigation Groups, <www.atla.org/Networking/Tier3fLitigationGroups.aspx>
(visited Aug 13, 2003).
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bers handling similar cases to exchange information and share
successful strategies. "91
In the diet drugs products liability litigation, a group of law-
yers handling state court cases around the country formed a
"plaintiffs' consortium,"' which among other things set up a web-
site for sharing information.9 A group of firms contributed funds
to put the defendant's document production in electronic and
coded form, and permitted other plaintiffs' lawyers to buy into the
arrangement.9
II. RELINQUISHMENT OF AUTONOMY AS A RATIONAL
CLIENT CHOICE
A. The Rational Choice to Relinquish Autonomy
To understand why plaintiffs rationally choose to relinquish
aspects of litigation autonomy, we need only consider the primary
reasons why a growing segment of the plaintiffs' bar views mass
collective representation-whether by gathering clients, by coor-
dinating with other lawyers, or by formal aggregation-as a
sound business model. Attenuation of the attorney-client rela-
tionship, it turns out, can be good for business in ways that bene-
fit the clientele.95 Mass collective representation allows firms to
take advantage of economies of scale to reduce the per-plaintiff
cost of pursuing claims. It allows and encourages them to invest
more heavily in the litigation by presenting stakes on the plain-
tiffs' side that are more in line with those seen by the defendant.
Finally, mass representation gives plaintiffs' counsel greater bar-
gaining leverage in settlement negotiations. Most plaintiffs' law-
" Litigation Groups Offer Winning Support to Members, ATLA Advocate 5 (Feb
2000). See also ATLA's L-tryptophan Group Provides Model for National Litigation Efforts,
ATLA Advocate 11 (March 1993).
See Attorneys Debate Merits of Fen-Phen Multi-District Litigation, Mealey Litig
Rep: Fen-Phen/Redux 4 (Feb 1998) (describing formation of a "loose confederation" of
lawyers for pursuing discovery); Paul D. Rheingold, Michael Coren, and Sol Weiss, State
Courts Provide New Forum for Mass Torts, Natl L J C28 (Feb 22, 1999) (discussing the
work of the plaintiffs' consortium in state court cases).
' See Multistate Litigation Diet Drugs/Fen-Phen Website and Bulletin Board,
<http://www.lawtomation.com/%7Eleflaw/fenphen> (visited Aug 12, 2003) (now defunct).
See Rheingold, Coren, and Weiss, Natl L J at C29 (cited in note 92).
I do not mean to suggest, of course, that most lawyers ought to start ignoring their
clients' individual concerns. In the vast bulk of legal representation, attenuation of the
attorney-client relationship is both bad lawyering and bad for business. My point focuses
solely on mass litigation in which collective representation advances client interests better
than individual representation.
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yers would not choose to describe this business model in terms of
attenuation of the lawyer-client relationship,6 but what makes
the model work is the lawyer's willingness to give priority to the
interests of the group, and unwillingness to allow individual cli-
ent preferences to derail the overall effectiveness of the collective
representation.9
Like their lawyers, most plaintiffs probably do not perceive
their choice of counsel as a decision to opt for an attenuated rela-
tionship or as a decision to relinquish litigation autonomy. Yet
part of a mass litigation practice's appeal is the firm's willingness
to invest substantial resources on behalf of its mass of similarly
situated clients, to level the field with defendants. Such firms
pitch their services to prospective clients based on the advantages
of the collective representation. The website of one prominent
mass tort plaintiffs' firm, for example, emphasizes the importance
of both gathering clients and coordinating with other lawyers:
In mass tort work, one firm may handle many of the vic-
tims, as we frequently do. This cuts down significantly on
costs since the costs of investigation and preparation are
spread among the many cases. Also, almost invariably
there is a network of attorneys sharing information and
jointly handling the legal proceedings against the defen-
dant in the case.9
Unsurprisingly, law firm promotional materials emphasize concern for individual
client needs, even as they advertise the strength that comes from collective representa-
tion. One leading asbestos plaintiffs' firm, for example, pronounces its founding principles
that "every client's case is the firm's most important case, and that every client deserves
his or her lawyer's diligent attention, compassion, and excellence," and touts the firm's
'attention to each client's individual needs." Website of Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C.,
<http://www.weitzlux.com/about/default.asp> (visited Aug 12, 2003). However, the web-
site also boasts that the firm "handled over 70% of all asbestos cases on the New York City
trial docket for the year 2001." See <http://www.weitzlux.compractice-area/asbestos.asp>
(visited Aug 12, 2003).
"7 In addition to these sound justifications for preferring mass litigation, there are
some ethically troubling reasons why some plaintiffs' firms might view attenuation of the
lawyer-client relationship as an appealing business model. Some firms, for example, may
find it possible to attract massive numbers of meritless claims through aggressive adver-
tising, and then try to leverage those claims into a settlement by the pressure created by
their sheer volume. To address this concern, David Rosenberg suggests forbidding class
settlements until after a summary judgment motion has been decided. See Rosenberg, 115
Harv L Rev at 884 n104 (cited in note 5).
Website of Rheingold, Valet, Rheingold, Shkolnik & McCartney LLP,
<http://www.rheingoldlaw.com/whatAre.html> (visited Aug 12, 2003).
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Bruce Hay and David Rosenberg note that the market for
mass tort plaintiffs' representation is dominated by groups of
plaintiffs' attorneys who represent large inventories of clients.
They suggest that this market pattern "expresses the preference
of plaintiffs for 'collective' rather than 'individual' representation
.... The vote in the marketplace is decidedly against the indi-
vidual benefits of so-called 'litigant autonomy,' contradicting the
supposition of the Supreme Court."9 While treating the market-
place for legal services as a meaningful expression of client pref-
erences may assume more rational and knowledgeable client de-
cision-making than is warranted,1°° I agree with their conclusion
that most clients in mass litigation settings prefer the strength of
collective representation, or at least that the well-informed plain-
tiff generally would prefer such representation. The dominance of
large-inventory firms in the mass litigation marketplace is con-
sistent with the soundness of collective representation both as a
business model for plaintiffs' firms and as a rational choice for
clients.
By representing many clients collectively, lawyers achieve
significant economies of scale.1 °1 Many claims in mass litigation
involve sufficiently small stakes, and sufficiently expensive issues
to litigate, that as a practical matter the claims would be impos-
sible to pursue individually. The efficiency of collective represen-
tation empowers plaintiffs to pursue what otherwise would con-
stitute negative value claims.
Moreover, by investing in the litigation at a level justified by
the amplified stakes of collective representation, lawyers can af-
ford to litigate at the highest level, including spending money on
investigation and retention of top experts.1 Mastery of a mass
9 Hay and Rosenberg, 75 Notre Dame L Rev at 1380 n 8 (cited in note 5).
"® Plaintiffs' firms with very large inventories of clients accumulate more money to
spend on advertising, as well as a long list of former clients for referrals and potential
solicitation. By reaching out to prospective clients and to referring lawyers, law firms
lengthen their client lists. See text accompanying notes 53-65. In mass litigation plain-
tiffs' practice, it is not surprising that the rich get richer. It is difficult, however, to disen-
tangle the client's choice of a firm with resources, experience, and leverage to maximize
the client's recovery, from the client's choice of a firm due to effective marketing.
1o' Firms make this point about scale economies to attract clients. See, for example,
website of Rheingold, Valet, Rheingold, Shkolnik & McCartney LLP, <http://www.
rheingoldlaw.com> (visited Aug 12, 2003) (listing pharmaceutical products for which the
firm is currently bringing lawsuits, and noting "[b]y handling a number of cases together
involving the same product, we can effect cost and time savings").
" David Rosenberg emphasizes the importance of "optimal investment" by plaintiffs'
counsel, and argues that "total aggregation is necessary to provide plaintiffs and courts a
full opportunity to exploit economies of scale in litigation to counter the asymmetry in
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tort requires an enormous amount of time and mental energy, not
to mention out-of-pocket expenses and firm resources. 1 3 To repre-
sent plaintiffs effectively, the lawyer must take advantage of
economies of scale by spreading those costs among many clients.
Some of the most effective mass tort lawyers find that to do top
quality legal work, they cannot handle more than one or two dif-
ferent mass torts at a time. As one mass tort plaintiffs' lawyer
puts it, "You find plaintiffs' law firms.. . who find themselves in
multiple mass torts at the same time, and no matter what your
devotion, it's impossible to be total masters of all of the nuances
of the millions of documents that any mass tort requires if you're
doing more than two at a time. Two I think is the absolute
max.,,1°4
Plaintiffs' lawyers must spend money and time to level the
field with defendants. For a defendant facing mass litigation, the
stakes of the litigation as a whole justify a huge expenditure of
resources for defense. A lawyer or firm representing a single
plaintiff cannot invest the money required to do battle against a
defendant that views the case as part of a mass litigation.
Whether by class action or by representation of multiple clients,
plaintiffs' lawyers who hope to battle on a level playing field with
mass litigation defendants must gather enough claims to justify
the expense of complex large-scale litigation. As one tobacco
plaintiffs' lawyer explained with regard to the Castano class ac-
tion: "Class action is about money. You couldn't get enough for a
single individual to justify the resources that you'd have to spend
to beat the tobacco company. ' ' In the diet drugs mass tort litiga-
litigation power favoring defendants that results from their ability to exploit de facto class
action scale economies in the standard separate action process." See David Rosenberg,
Mass Production Goods, Torts and Justice: The Problem of Opt-Out (2002) (working paper
on file with author).
" The administrator of the Plaintiffs' Legal Committee for the Castano Tobacco Liti-
gation describes the exhaustive document review required in mass litigation, and the need
to set up new office space to accommodate the sheer volume of documents: "The discovery
in these cases, the paper, there's so much. You know, there's just so much that they can't
possibly have room for it .... They throw millions and millions of pages of garbage at you.
You know, their discovery responses are not very specific, okay? You might go through
fifteen boxes of paper and find one document that's relevant. But you have to go through it
all. You have to look at it all. And the hundreds and hundreds and hundreds and hun-
dreds of depositions and trial testimony from prior cases. It all has to be gone through.
And so the sheer volume is unbelievable." Interview with Suzanne Foulds (Jan 7, 2002)
("Foulds Interview").
MacDonald Interview (cited in note 54).
105 Interview with Danny Abel, Esq. (January 6, 2002) ("Abel Interview"). Abel com-
pared the Castano class action with Cipollone v Liggett Group, Inc, 505 US 504 (1992), in
which an individual smoker and his spouse brought an action against cigarette manufac-
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tion, in which the firm of Robinson & Cole represented two dozen
plaintiffs with high-value cases, the firm spent three million dol-
lars of lawyer time, "plus one million dollars cold hard cash."'Or
Had the firm represented only one or a few plaintiffs, it would not
have been willing to invest such substantial resources in the liti-
gation.
The business model for a plaintiffs' firm engaged in mass tort
litigation requires getting plenty of clients. According to one par-
ticipant:
The folks who do it in a very well-known way.. .Stan
Chesley and Paul [Rheingold] and Arnold Levin and
Turner Branch, the folks who've been doing it for years,
understand that if it is a true mass tort, that there's going
to be a center of gravity, that they will not be alone, that
the first and most pivotal thing to do in a mass tort is to
get the cases, is to get the good cases.1°7
As another plaintiffs' lawyer put it: "If you can't sign up enough
plaintiffs, the economics don't work.""~
The economies of scale and other advantages achieved by
signing up massive numbers of clients also can be achieved by
forging a coalition of plaintiffs' firms. The Castano group in the
tobacco litigation found that by pooling their talent and re-
sources, they could pursue tobacco cases much more powerfully
together than separately. According to one lawyer who was in-
volved in the Castano litigation from the start, Louisiana lawyer
Wendell Gauthier and his colleagues thought:
Who can fight the tobacco companies? Who can ever outfi-
nance them? But maybe if we get the people that we've
met over the last fifteen years who have comparable plain-
tiffs' firms, and we start off by having everyone put up a
turers after the smoker contracted lung cancer: "Even if Cipollone had recovered ten mil-
lion dollars, [plaintiff's attorney] Marc [Edell] may have spent ten million dollars. You
have to depose the same experts. The evidence you have to offer to prove your various
claims-it's the same gang of experts, and amounts and mass of evidence that you have to
present to prove one claim as to prove the claim for the whole class. If you win the whole
class you get Cipollone's recovery times a million."
" MacDonald Interview (cited in note 54)
" Id.
' Abel Interview (cited in note 105).
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hundred grand, then maybe we can have a pool of money
that will at least get us through the first stage. 1°9
By combining the resources of many firms and investing in the
litigation as a group effort, the Castano group was able to process
documents much more effectively than an individual firm could
have done, and at a level that could not have been contemplated
on behalf of any individual or small group of clients. ° Moreover,
the Castano group lawyers brought different skills and experi-
ences to the table."'
Similarly, pharmaceutical mass tort litigation ordinarily in-
volves a coordinated effort by plaintiffs' lawyers. This kind of liti-
gation tends be dominated by the same fifty or sixty plaintiffs'
law firms, and successful mass tort lawyers understand the im-
portance of putting together a coalition of those firms to handle
large-scale litigation capably. "If you don't get a significant num-
ber of those people interested in your litigation," says Russ Her-
man, "you're going to be in big trouble. Because they've got the
resources. Not just the money, but the intellectual resources, the
,,112know-how, the contacts. "  '
Whether by representing numerous clients, or by coordinat-
ing with other firms to put together a coalition representing nu-
merous clients, plaintiffs' lawyers gain bargaining leverage in
settlement negotiations.11 3 Indeed, the enhanced leverage that
10 Id.
"' The Castano group provided to each of the member firms a binder of CDs contain-
ing the relevant documents. Each binder contained 110 CDs, with approximately 25,000
pages of documents on each CD, for a total of over 2.5 million documents. By sharing the
cost of imaging and processing, and treating it as an investment in a massive litigation
enterprise rather than an individual case, the group was able to create an accessible,
searchable binder of coded documents. Foulds Interview (cited in note 103).
"' Some, such as Dianne Nast, Elizabeth Cabraser, and Will Kemp, were known
especially for their understanding of the law and their ability to craft powerful arguments.
Others, such as Ralph Knowles and Francis Hare, were considered particularly strong in
discovery and depositions. Still others, such as John Coale, Russ Herman, and Hugh
Rodham, were known for their political abilities and connections. The leader of the group,
Wendell Gauthier, brought the ability to keep this group of oversized personalities focused
on a common objective. Herman Interview (cited in note 69); Abel Interview (cited in note
105); Foulds Interview (cited in note 103). See also Peter Pringle, Cornered: Big Tobacco at
the Bar of Justice (cited in note 73); Dan Zegart, Civil Warriors: The Legal Siege on the
Tobacco Industry (Delacorte 2000).
1 Herman Interview (cited in note 69).
1 To some extent, the leverage simply derives from the economies of scale and
greater investment in the litigation. Lawyers with the wherewithal and incentive to pur-
sue litigation vigorously command respect in settlement negotiations. The settlement
leverage of collective representation also flows from defendants' desire for peace. An at-
torney negotiating on behalf of a large group of plaintiffs can offer the defendant more
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comes from combining large numbers of claims has drawn criti-
cism from those who disapprove of the power of collective repre-
sentation to obtain settlement recoveries for plaintiffs with ques-
tionable claims. In the class action context, some judges and de-
fendants decry what they view as the extortionate settlement
pressure created by class litigation. 114 In non-class litigation, too,
sheer accumulation can create leverage for settlement of indi-
vidually weak claims. 15 The connection between this leverage and
plaintiffs' preference for group representation is obvious. What is
not obvious is why this should be frowned upon. Assuming claims
that are weak but non-frivolous, there is nothing inherently
problematic about settlement amounts that are discounted for the
weakness of the claims. Particularly in the mass toxic tort arena,
uncertainty concerning scientific causation and difficulty estab-
lishing exposure render many plausible claims hard to prove.
Such claims may be unlikely to succeed on the merits if they go to
trial, but their small possibility of success gives them settlement
value, especially when negotiated as a large block. If block set-
tlements reflect the probability that some of the plaintiffs would
prevail but others would fail-not because of real differences, but
because of the randomness inherent in large numbers of low-
thorough peace, even if total peace is unobtainable outside of mandatory class actions and
bankruptcy. Defendants' search for peace, and plaintiffs' counsel's search for massive
numbers of clients, lead settlement negotiations toward inclusive resolutions. In the words
of one plaintiffs' lawyer, "[in the mass torts, as practiced at the federal level, there is an a
priori, intrinsic impulse that the end game will not be trial, but a global settlement."
MacDonald Interview (cited in note 54).
14 See, for example, In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc, 51 F3d 1293, 1298-99 (7th Cir
1995) (discussing defendants' "intense pressure to settle"). Charles Silver analyzes four
different versions of the "blackmail thesis" and finds that none of them survives scrutiny.
See Charles Silver, "We're Scared to Death": Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 NYU L
Rev 1357 (2003). Professors Hay and Rosenberg agree that the danger of blackmail set-
tlements is overstated, and in any event can be remedied by adopting a policy of multiple
class trials. See Hay and Rosenberg, 75 Notre Dame L Rev at 1402-07 (cited in note 5).
1' Judge Jack Weinstein describes the phenomenon as follows: "Often the pressure
for block settlements comes from plaintiffs' attorneys who hope to get something for a
large mass of questionable cases. Some attorneys are selective about the cases they take,
while others will take almost any case without regard to its merit, hoping for a global
settlement. The attorneys with thousands of cases are almost invariably in this second
category." Weinstein, Individual Justice at 74 (1995) (cited in note 29). He notes that a
defense attorney he interviewed "did not fault plaintiffs' attorneys for taking all available
cases because ordinarily each plaintiff recovers something in large settlements." Id at 260
n 141.
"' It is, of course, improper for an attorney to prosecute claims that lack a non-
frivolous factual and legal basis, regardless of defendants' willingness to pay to get rid of
nuisance claims. See MRPC 3.1; FRCP 11.
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probability claims-then the settlement may prove sensible for
both defendants and plaintiffs, and beneficial for the public.
With economies of scale, expanded litigation investment, and
enhanced settlement leverage, mass collective representation
brings significant advantages that level the field against well-
financed defendants, even without the empowerment that comes
from formal class certification.
11 7
..7 Based on the rational plaintiffs ex ante preference for optimal deterrence, and thus
for the strength of collective representation, David Rosenberg argues that class actions are
preferable to both individual actions and voluntary collective efforts. He views the collec-
tive action problems of voluntary collective efforts as insurmountable. See Rosenberg, The
Problem of Opt-Out (cited in note 102); Hay and Rosenberg, 75 Notre Dame L Rev at
1387-88. I have written elsewhere of the need for more thorough formal aggregation
mechanisms, see Erichson, 50 Duke L J at 464-69 (cited in note 29), and, to an extent, I
am sympathetic to Rosenberg's preference for formal aggregation. I disagree, however,
with Rosenberg's conclusion that mandatory class actions are the only solution to the
collective action problems of mass litigation. Rosenberg's skepticism about the possibility
of significant non-class collective litigation follows from his overstatement of the collective
action problems in joinder and counsel coordination. Properly handled, non-class collective
litigation not only is viable, but goes a long way toward leveling the field against resource-
rich defendants. Contrary to Rosenberg's logic, there is no need to certify a mandatory
class action in order to have sufficient incentive for the plaintiffs' lawyers to invest heavily
in litigation. A firm or consortium of firms representing hundreds or thousands of plain-
tiffs ordinarily invests sufficient time and money to litigate at a high level. Further in-
vestment in litigation inevitably reaches a point of diminishing returns. The field has in
fact become much more level in mass tort litigation, where plaintiffs' firms representing
large inventories invest enormous resources in the litigation, sometimes with the help of
outside financing, and often by pooling resources with other firms.
Rosenberg worries that non-class collective representation cannot succeed if plain-
tiffs can free ride. See Rosenberg, 115 Harv L Rev at 847 (cited in note 5). The free-rider
problem, however, looks more serious in theory than in practice. In mass litigation, most
plaintiffs retain lawyers engaged in large-scale collective representation, as Rosenberg
acknowledges. Plaintiffs who retain lawyers not engaged in collective representation lose
much of the benefit. While they may benefit from the stare decisis value of adjudications,
and they may gain access to documents revealed in discovery or used at trial, many of the
benefits of collective representation are lost by the would-be free-rider. The bargaining
leverage that comes from representing a large group inures to the benefit of the repre-
sented group, and plaintiffs in mass litigation often find it difficult to employ offensive
non-mutual issue preclusion. See Howard M. Erichson, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 96
Mich L Rev 945, 956-57 n 42 (1998) (discussing solutions to the free-rider problem of
nonmutual issue preclusion). Moreover, one has to wonder what the free rider hopes to
gain by declining collective representation. Ordinarily, the individual plaintiffs lawyer
charges a contingent fee, which is unlikely to be lower than that of the lawyer represent-
ing a large number of plaintiffs. If anything, one would expect the costs, and perhaps also
the fees, to be lower in the group representation than in the individual representation. In
any event, non-class litigation offers certain advantages to plaintiffs. If separate lawsuits
go forward, plaintiffs can work along separate paths to obtain more discovery than would
be possible in a single action. Also, a defendant facing claims by numerous plaintiffs gains
a greater efficiency advantage than plaintiffs from a single suit.
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B. The Rational Choice to Retain Autonomy
In mass litigation, most plaintiffs retain lawyers with large
inventories of similar claims or lawyers who work closely with
others who represent similarly situated clients, and for most
plaintiffs, this can be justified as a rational choice for the benefits
of group representation rather than for the autonomy of individ-
ual representation.11 s It need not, however, be every plaintiff's
choice. Several considerations might lead a rational plaintiff to
choose individual rather than group representation.
First, some clients may rationally decide that they maximize
the value of their claim by avoiding massive group representa-
tion. Plaintiffs with low value claims would rarely if ever reach
this conclusion." 9 Plaintiffs with significant losses, however, face
a different decision. Such high-damages claimants in mass litiga-
tion may include institutional investors in securities litigation or
severely injured plaintiffs in mass tort litigation. The possibility
of a large recovery may provide sufficient incentive for a skilled
lawyer to pursue such a claim vigorously. A plaintiff with a
strong claim may seek a particular lawyer. The top tier of the
plaintiffs' bar includes not only class action lawyers and other
aggregators, but also lawyers who eschew aggregation, preferring
to select individual cases carefully and press them to trial.'2° A
lawyer representing a plaintiff individually can select the most
advantageous forum for the particular claim, and can pursue the
litigation in the particular plaintiff's best interest. By contrast,
collective representation presents conflicts of interest, which are
amplified by the higher stakes of a particular plaintiff's claim.
Thus, while most clients in mass litigation benefit from collective
representation, some plaintiffs with strong claims may worry
11 This is not to say that every plaintiff makes a knowing choice. The market domi-
nance of firms that represent plaintiffs in large groups arguably expresses clients' prefer-
ence for the strength of collective representation, but alternatively can be explained by the
power of advertising and referrals. See note 53.
"' We can divide claims into four levels of viability based on the size of the potential
recovery, discounted by probability of recovery, weighed against the cost of obtaining
recovery. First-level claims have high enough stakes that they are viable even without
mass representation. Second-level claims are viable only with economies of scale, whether
by class action or by non-class collective representation. Third-level claims involve suffi-
ciently low stakes that they are viable only as a class action. Fourth-level claims are so
low in value, relative to the cost of litigation and probability of success, that they are not
viable even as a class action.
" See Herbert M. Kritzer, From Litigators of Ordinary Cases to Litigators of Ex-
traordinary Cases: Stratification of the Plaintiffs' Bar in the Twenty-First Century, 51
DePaul L Rev 219, 225-26 (2001).
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that collective representation will have a damage-averaging ef-
fect, raising the value of weak claims and reducing the value of
strong ones.121
Second, individual client preferences vary as to remedies,
relationships, and process values. Similarly situated clients may
disagree on appropriate remedies. Some plaintiffs may favor
maximum monetary compensation, whereas others may place
higher priority on non-monetary relief. In employment litigation,
some plaintiffs may prefer injunctive relief, and in securities liti-
gation, some plaintiffs may prefer institutional reform within the
corporation. Some clients value a personal lawyer-client relation-
ship. They may desire individual counseling on legal and non-
legal aspects of the problem at issue in the lawsuit, particularly
in personal injury mass torts. Some clients may care more than
others about process values such as the opportunity for expres-
sion through pleadings, at trial, or otherwise. Some clients may
feel that individual representation better protects their personal
dignity.122 The question is to what extent plaintiffs are willing to
trade such preferences for maximization of compensation. While
most plaintiffs choose to proceed with large-scale group represen-
' Similar considerations encourage plaintiffs with the strongest claims to opt out
disproportionately from class actions:
There are a number of reasons why the right to assert individual claims may
be very important to those opt-out plaintiffs who have disproportionately lar-
ger damage claims than most members of the class. First, bargaining within
the class-plaintiffs' attorney team tends to disfavor high-stakes plaintiffs....
A related problem is that attorneys for the class may find it easier to facili-
tate a settlement by averaging the damages of all class members rather than
by expending the extra time and energy required to differentiate among the
respective settlement values of individual claims. These two problems are
exacerbated by the typical position of high-stakes plaintiffs as a minority
among class members; thus, greater political pressure exists for class attor-
neys to favor low-stakes plaintiffs. . .. All of these factors imply that high-
stakes plaintiffs have better chances for larger recoveries if they opt out and
pursue their claims individually.
Steve Baughman, Note, Class Actions in the Asbestos Context: Balancing the Due Process
Considerations Implicated by the Right to Opt Out, 70 Tex L Rev 211, 222-23 (1991).
" Frank Michelman describes the "dignity values" and "participation values" served
by allowing persons to litigate. See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litiga-
tion Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights, 1973 Duke L J 1153, 1172 (1973). In
contrast to prohibitive court access fees or denials of hearings, group representation of the
sort I describe need not entirely discard dignity and participation values. Indeed, one
might argue that group representation provides more effective political participation than
individual representation. Nevertheless, individual litigation probably better serves these
process values in most cases. Such values matter to a good number of clients. See E. Allan
Lind and Tom R. Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice at 93-106 (Plenum
1988); John Thibault and Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 Cal L Rev 541, 548-
52 (1978).
5191 CURRENT ISSUES IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
tation, some plaintiffs may rationally choose to avoid massive
representation based on their particular litigation position or
personal preferences. That choice should be put to plaintiffs ex-
plicitly, as discussed in Part III A, by the process of informed con-
sent.
In reality, of course, clients do not face a binary choice be-
tween individual and collective representation, between total
autonomy and none.12 Trial lawyers who handle selected individ-
ual claims, rather than class actions or massive inventories, need
not represent only one client within a mass litigation. A prospec-
tive client with a strong claim can seek out a lawyer who, instead
of handling thousands of claims, handles a few dozen major
claims. Alex MacDonald, one of the prominent lawyers in the fen-
phen litigation, rather than representing hundreds of plaintiffs
with weaker claims, represented twenty-four fen-phen plaintiffs
suffering from primary pulmonary hypertension, by and large the
most serious claims in the litigation." A plaintiff with a suffi-
ciently strong claim thus can choose a lawyer who will take the
individual claim seriously, without entirely forgoing the benefits
of collective representation.
III. LAWYER LOYALTY AND CLIENT AUTONOMY
Lawyers owe their clients a duty of loyalty. Loyalty requires
lawyers to avoid conflicts of interest,' 2 and encompasses a num-
ber of more particular duties identified by the law governing law-
yers, including the duties of competence" and diligence,1 27 and
the duty to inform and advise.28 In the canonical language of the
Model Code, "[a] lawyer should represent a client zealously
'"' Indeed, even in purely individual tort representation, clients exercise relatively
little control over their litigation. See Deborah R. Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts:
Myths and Realities, 1989 U Ill L Rev 89, 92-97 (1989).
24 MacDonald understands the danger of losing sight of the individuality of his cli-
ents. "It is easy for all of us who are functionaries in this system to lose the central reality
of what we are doing," he says. "We are dealing with cases each of which has a human
face, and too often the human face is made invisible to us .... It's an instance in which
language and mindsets and cognitive approaches to reality allow one to distance oneself
from the heartbreaking reality of why I do what I do for a living." MacDonald Interview
(cited in note 54).
' See MRPC 1.7-1.11. See also MRPC 1.7, comment 1-4 (addressing issues of loyalty
to clients).
" See MRPC 1.1.
127 See MRPC 1.3.
'" See MRPC 1.4.
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within the bounds of the law."'2 The duty of loyalty runs to each
individual client. In cases where clients retain the lawyer for the
benefit of collective representation, however, it makes sense to
permit lawyers to comply with their duty of loyalty by focusing on
the interests of the group as a whole. But there is a catch. If a
lawyer wishes to exercise the duty of loyalty by serving client in-
terests collectively rather than individually, the lawyer must al-
low clients to retain two critical moments of autonomy: at the
outset of collective representation, and at settlement.
By providing these moments of individual decision-making,
but otherwise focusing on the interests of the group, lawyers in
non-class collective representation can mirror much of what is
achieved by opt-out class actions. The duty of class counsel runs
to the class. The Advisory Committee Note to the current Rule 23
amendments states the point plainly: "Appointment as class
counsel means that the primary obligation of counsel is to the
class rather than to any individual members of it." 130 Although a
class is likely to include members with some conflicting inter-
ests,3 the class action procedure provides sufficient benefit to
class members that some tolerance of conflicts is justified, as long
as proper incentives and procedural safeguards are in place to
protect the interests of class members.
A. Client Autonomy at Outset
1. Class actions: notice, opt-out, and opt-in.
Class members give up nearly all opportunity to control the
litigation of their claims. 132 Before relinquishing autonomy, how-
ever, each plaintiff in a money damages class action is given a
moment for autonomous decision-making. By the notice and opt-
out opportunity afforded by Rule 23,' class members are offered
'29 Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 7. See also MRPC 1.3, comment
1 ("A lawyer must [1 act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and
with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf.").
"' Proposed FRCP 23(g)(1)(B) Advisory Committee Note (May 20, 2002).
131 See, for example, Bash v Firstmark Standard Life Insurance Co, 861 F2d 159, 161
(7th Cir 1988) ("[C]onflicts of interest are built into the device of the class action, where a
single lawyer may be representing a class consisting of thousands of persons not all of
whom will have identical interests and views.").
"' But compare Devlin v Scardelletti, 536 US 1 (2002) (holding that objecting un-
named class members may appeal).
"3 See FRCP 23(c). The notice and opt-out requirement of Rule 23(c) applies only to
class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(3). Class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or
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a chance to decide whether to participate in the group effort. The
Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of the opt-out
opportunity as a requirement not only of Rule 23, but also of con-
stitutional due process."
A meaningful opt-out opportunity requires effective notice,
and recent years have seen significant efforts to improve the
readability of class notices. The 2002 proposed amendments to
Rule 23 require that "notice must concisely and clearly state in
plain, easily understood language" the nature of the action, the
class definition, the right to appear through counsel, the right to
opt out, and the binding effect of a judgment on class members. 1 5
The Federal Judicial Center has undertaken a project to improve
the readability of class action notices by designing notices using
plain language; lawyers can find the model notices at the Federal
Judicial Center's website." Class action lawyers increasingly
turn to experts for help in designing effective notice. Such experts
not only bring their know-how to bear on the design of eye-
catching and comprehensible notice forms, but also use their
marketing expertise to plan a notice campaign targeted to reach
as many class members as possible.
For the decision whether to participate in a class action, an
opt-in process protects client autonomy more fully than the opt-
out process of Rule 23, because the opt-out process sets class
membership as the default. Indeed, opt-in class actions can be
understood as a mass variation on permissive party joinder.1 37
(b)(2), known as mandatory class actions, generally do not allow class members an oppor-
tunity to exclude themselves from the class. Because (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions are best
understood as special cases of compulsory party joinder, opt-out does not fit with the prin-
ciples underlying them. Compare FRCP 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) with FRCP 19(a). This paper
addresses non-class litigation for money damages that functions like a class action under
FRCP 23(b)(3), and therefore treats opt-out as a fundamental requirement, despite the
existence of other class actions in which opt-out is unavailable.
" See Phillips Petroleum Co v Shutts, 472 US 797 (1985) (holding that due process
requires notice and opt-out opportunity for absent class members in a money damages
class action). See also Ortiz v Fibreboard Corp, 527 US 815, 848 (1999) (citing Shutts for
the proposition that "before an absent class member's right of action was extinguishable
due process required that the member 'receive notice plus an opportunity to be heard and
participate in the litigation,' and we said that 'at a minimum... an absent plaintiff [must]
be provided with an opportunity to remove himself from the class'").
Proposed FRCP 23(c)(2)(B).
' See The Federal Judicial Center's "Illustrative" Forms of Class Action Notice,
<http://www.ic.gov/newweb/jnetweb.nsf/pages/376> (visited Aug 12, 2003).
'37 One appellate court addressing an opt-in class action referred to the litigation as "a
form of permissive joinder of parties." Male v Grand Rapids Education Association, 295
NW2d 918, 921 (Mich App 1980). Conceptualizing opt-in class actions as a mass variation
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Although the opt-out version remains the norm, courts have certi-
fied class actions on an opt-in basis,'3 and certain federal statutes
explicitly authorize opt-in class actions for civil proceedings. 139 A
Philadelphia court offers a straightforward explanation of the
difference between opt-out and opt-in class actions:
An "opt-out" class action refers to class actions where
every member of the class is included in the class suit
unless they file a written election to be excluded from the
class. In short, you're in unless you say you're out.... An
opt-in class action, by contrast, refers to class suits where
no one is included in the class unless they file a written
election to be included in the class. In short, you're out
unless you say you're in.14°
Pennsylvania's class action rule expressly authorizes opt-in class
actions as an exception to the usual opt-out process.141
In 1995, the federal Advisory Committee on Civil Rules ex-
plored the idea of opt-in class actions, although ultimately the
committee did not go forward with the proposal. In a draft of pro-
posed amendments to Rule 23, Judge Sam Pointer offered a revi-
sion of the class action rule to permit either opt-in or opt-out
processes, or neither, at the court's discretion: "An order certify-
ing a class action must describe the class and determine whether,
on Rule 20 permissive party joinder provides a nice symmetry, inasmuch as mandatory
class actions are best understood as mass variations on Rule 19 compulsory party joinder.
38 See Doe v United States, 44 Fed Appx 499 (Fed Cir 2002) (addressing motion to
intervene in a Federal Employees Pay Act lawsuit certified by the Court of Federal Claims
as an opt-in class action); Thiessen v General Electric Capital Corp, 267 F3d 1095 (10th
Cir 2001) (reversing a decertification of an opt-in class action under the ADEA); Sinyard v
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, T C Memo 1998-364 (Oct 7, 1998) (noting that "ADEA
class actions generally constitute opt-in class actions"); Male, 295 NW2d 918 at 921-22
(requiring an opt-in procedure for a class action seeking refund of an allegedly illegal
assessment on teachers); Katlin v Tremoglie, 43 Pa D&C 4th 373 (Phil Cty 1999) (certify-
ing an opt-in class action in case based on defendants' failure to disclose that physician
was unlicensed).
"' See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 USC §216(b) (2000) (providing that an employer
who violates the act "shall be liable to the employee or employees affected," but that "[n]o
employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writ-
ing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is
brought"); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 USC § 626(b) (2000) (expressly bor-
rowing the procedures, including the opt-in mechanism, of the Fair Labor Standards Act).
Katlin, 43 Pa D&C 4th at 413 n 23.
See Pa RCP § 1711(b) (authorizing opt-in, rather than opt-out, class action if "(1)
the individual claims are substantial, and the potential members of the class have suffi-
cient resources, experience and sophistication in business affairs to conduct their own
litigation; or (2) other special circumstances exist which are described in the order").
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when, how, and under what conditions putative members may
elect to be excluded from, or included in, the class." 42
The Pennsylvania class action rule authorizes opt-in class
actions if "the individual claims are substantial, and the potential
members of the class have sufficient resources, experience and
sophistication in business affairs to conduct their own litiga-
tion."'4 In other words, if individual claims are substantial
enough that plaintiffs realistically could choose to proceed indi-
vidually, the rule permits a court to certify a class on an opt-in
basis.'"
Turning to non-class litigation, the logic of the Pennsylvania
rule suggests the importance of giving plaintiffs a meaningful
opportunity to decide whether to participate in a collective repre-
sentation. While not all plaintiffs have business sophistication,
plaintiffs in non-class litigation largely are those who sought
counsel to pursue their claims, and by definition are those who
asserted their claims on a non-class basis.1
142 Draft Proposed FRCP 23(c)(1)(A) (1995) (on file with author) (emphasis added).
The draft offered factors for courts to consider in deciding whether to certify an opt-in, opt-
out, or mandatory class action. "The matters pertinent to this determination will ordinar-
ily include: (i) the nature of the controversy and the relief sought; (ii) the extent and na-
ture of the members' injuries or liability; (iii) potential conflicts of interest among mem-
bers; (iv) the interest of the party opposing the class in securing a final and consistent
resolution of the matters in controversy; and (v) the inefficiency or impracticality of sepa-
rate actions to resolve the controversy." Id.
... Pa RCP § 1711(b)(1).
... In Katlin, which involved claims against an unlicensed physician and health care
provider entities for failing to disclose that the physician was unlicensed. "Because some
members of the class may have substantial claims," the court held, "an opt-in procedure is
necessary to protect their interests." 43 Pa D&C 4th at 413.
' The same logic can be applied from the other direction. Money damages class ac-
tions involving negative value claims-claims on which the cost of litigation would exceed
the expected recovery-should be permitted on an opt-out, rather than opt-in, basis. As
the Supreme Court explained in Shutts, 472 US at 812-13:
Requiring a plaintiff to affirmatively request inclusion would probably im-
pede the prosecution of those class actions involving an aggregation of small
individual claims, where a large number of claims are required to make it
economical to bring suit.. . . The plaintiffs claim may be so small, or the
plaintiff so unfamiliar with the law, that he would not file suit individually,
nor would he affirmatively request inclusion in the class if such a request
were required by the Constitution.
(internal citations omitted).
See also Testa v City of Providence, 572 A2d 1336, 1338 (RI 1990) (rejecting trial
court's opt-in requirement in a class action involving average claims of thirty-two dollars
for excessive sewer fees, noting that "an opt-in requirement would render this class action
prohibitive, both economically and practically").
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2. Non-class collective representation: informed consent to
conflict of interest.
In non-class collective representation, the notice and opt-out
requirements of the class action rule do not apply, but legal ethics
principles can provide a similar decisionmaking moment at the
outset. To see how the rules of professional responsibility provide
the equivalent of a class action opt-out opportunity, one first
must recognize the potential conflicts between individual and
group interests in collective representation. Next, one must rec-
ognize that ex ante, most plaintiffs in mass litigation would want
their lawyer to focus on advancing collective rather than individ-
ual interests. Mass collective representation, then, involves po-
tential conflicts between the client's individual interests and the
interests of other clients, but notwithstanding those conflicts, a
client rationally could expect the lawyer to advance the client's
interests diligently and competently. In terms of legal ethics
rules, this describes an easily recognizable situation: a Model
Rule of Professional Conduct ("MRPC") 1.7(a)(2) concurrent cli-
ent-client conflict of interest, but one that is waivable under
MRPC 1.7(b).
MRPC 1.7(a)(2) provides that a concurrent conflict of interest
exists if "there is a significant risk that the representation of one
or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's respon-
sibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by
a personal interest of the lawyer."' 46 MRPC 1.7(b) permits clients
to consent to conflicts of interest under certain circumstances:
Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of
interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a
client if: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer
will be able to provide competent and diligent representa-
tion to each affected client; ... and (4) each affected client
gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. 147
Conflicts of interest inhere in collective representation.
Unless the plaintiffs' interests are perfectly aligned, which is
rare, a lawyer representing multiple plaintiffs with related claims
inevitably faces decisions about whose interests to advance. As
Judge Jack Weinstein has explained with regard to mass tort
141 MRPC 1.7(a)(2).
117 MRPC 1.7(b).
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litigation, "[wihile the attorney representing a large number of
clients might, in theory, be able to reach some approximation of
the objectives of the group as a whole, that attorney cannot possi-
bly account for the varying desires of individual members of the
group."" In mass litigation, any conflict between individual and
group interests likely presents not only a concurrent client-client
conflict, but also a concurrent client-lawyer conflict. 149 Plaintiffs'
lawyers' fees, ordinarily tied to the size of the overall recovery for
the group, give lawyers an economic stake in favoring group in-
terests.
Even with similarly situated clients, conflicts arise between
individual and group interests. Conflicts appear, for example,
concerning whose case to bring to trial first. The first trial in
mass litigation carries enormous strategic weight, not only in
terms of publicity and momentum, but also because of the first
judgment's uniquely powerful potential to generate offensive non-
mutual issue preclusion. i ° Suppose a client's case is moving to-
ward trial. The client desires a trial as soon as possible, perhaps
because she needs prompt compensation, or because she has con-
cerns about the unavailability of key witnesses with the passage
of time. Her lawyer, however, knows that the particular client's
case is problematic and that the collective interests of the plain-
tiffs would be better served by delaying that case and speeding
another to trial first.51 Should the plaintiffs' lawyer be permitted
Weinstein, Individual Justice at 63 (cited in note 29).
'' Rule 1.7(a)(2) addresses not only the risk that representation of a client will be
'materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client," but also "by a per-
sonal interest of the lawyer." MRPC 1.7(a)(2).
' On the strategic importance of first trials for issue preclusion, see Erichson, 96
Mich L Rev at 952-54 (cited in note 117).
"' The lawyers representing Betty Mekdeci, the first Bendectin plaintiff to go to trial,
encountered this problem. After the first jury found against her, a new trial was granted
on appeal. Mekdeci's lawyers considered her case more problematic than some others, and
wanted to postpone the retrial to allow other cases to go to trial first. When Mekdeci re-
fused to postpone her trial, the lawyers unsuccessfully tried to withdraw from represent-
ing her. See Mekdeci v Merrell National Laboratories, A Division of Richardson-Merrell,
Inc, 711 F2d 1510, 1516 (11th Cir 1983); see also Michael D. Green, Bendectin and Birth
Defects: The Challenges of Mass Toxic Substances Litigation (1996). Professor Richard
Marcus, looking at the Mekdeci case, suggests that coordinating lawyers' duties to their
own clients should be tempered by consideration of collective interests: "Mekdeci's case
provides some reason for feeling that client desires may legitimately be conditioned on the
'greater good' of the overall plaintiff group in some litigations involving multiple claim-
ants." Richard L. Marcus, Reexamining the Bendectin Litigation Story, 83 Iowa L Rev 231,
252-53 (1997).
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to advance aggregate interests by pushing a stronger case to trial
before the problematic case?152
Another area of conflict between individual and group inter-
ests involves the confidentiality of discovery materials. In any
individual plaintiffs case, the client may benefit by agreeing to
whatever confidentiality provisions a defendant requests, because
agreement eases the flow of discovery. The collective interests of
the plaintiffs, however, are better served by resisting unreason-
able confidentiality agreements and protective orders, to main-
tain the ability of plaintiffs' lawyers to share information con-
cerning the litigation. May the lawyer advance aggregate inter-
ests by resisting overprotective confidentiality provisions, or by
negotiating a clause in the confidentiality agreement that per-
mits sharing among plaintiffs' lawyers handling similar cases?
Indeed, when a lawyer represents a large group of plaintiffs,
conflicts may arise with regard to a wide range of litigation deci-
sions. Some of these conflicts simply involve prioritizing among
litigation objectives. In discovery, for example, a lawyer must de-
cide which information to seek first or most aggressively. May a
lawyer focus first on information needed for the many, rather
than on information needed for an individual?
In most of these situations, the multiple representation ought
to be permitted with client consent. Under the conflict of interest
rules, a lawyer may seek client consent to a concurrent conflict of
"' The ethical question I am raising here is the concurrent client-client conflict of
interest between individual and group interests regarding the order of trials. The conflict
can be understood in light of more particular duties owed to an individual client whose
case may be delayed, including the duty of diligence and the duty to allow the client to
determine the objectives of the representation. See MRPC 1.2, 1.3. In addition to the po-
tential conflict of interest, pushing one client's case to trial ahead of others represented by
the same lawyer raises a number of other ethical issues. In particular, any effort to delay
weaker cases to allow passing room for stronger ones encounters important ethical and
procedural limitations. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, for example, permits sanctions
if a paper is "presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unneces-
sary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation." FRCP 11(b)(1). Federal law also
authorizes courts to impose costs and fees on an attorney who "multiplies the proceedings
in any case unreasonably and vexatiously." 28 USC § 1927. MRPC 3.1 prohibits frivolous
proceedings, assertions, or controvertions, and MRPC 3.2 requires that lawyers "make
reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client."
Nevertheless, as I have addressed elsewhere in connection with issue preclusion
strategy, "there remains ample room for practitioners to retard or expedite the process.
Delay comes not only from ethically questionable stalling tactics and does not require
explicit adjournments. Delay comes, for example, from each nonfrivolous but nonessential
motion. It comes from full relevant discovery where partial discovery might suffice. Delay
comes from demanding a jury rather than bench trial, from forum-shopping for a crowded
docket, and any of a host of other litigation maneuvers." Erichson, 96 Mich L Rev at 953
n30 (cited in note 117).
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interest if the lawyer reasonably believes that she can "provide
competent and diligent representation to each affected client."',
Given the advantages of collective representation-the economies
of scale, higher investment, and enhanced settlement position-
lawyers should be able to provide representation that is more
competent and more diligent by virtue of collective strength. If
the lawyer can serve clients competently and diligently by work-
ing to advance the interests of the group as a whole, then in-
formed consent is permitted under Rule 1.7(b).
The answer to the conflict of interest question implies an an-
swer to the loyalty question. The reason to permit multiple repre-
sentation is that the strength of collective representation permits
a lawyer to represent clients effectively notwithstanding potential
conflicts. Therefore, the lawyer representing a massive number of
similarly situated clients ought not strive to maximize each cli-
ent's autonomy in the course of the litigation, but rather ought to
strive to maximize the interests of the group as a whole.'5
In each of the situations described above, if the representa-
tion of multiple plaintiffs is permitted, then the lawyer represent-
ing them ought to make the decisions that best advance the in-
terests of the group as a whole. After all, the conflict exists in
both directions, so a lawyer cannot avoid the conflict simply by
favoring a client's individual interests over the group's. If the
lawyer chooses to advance an individual client's interests at the
expense of the group, she breaches her duty of loyalty to the other
clients in the group. Given a situation in which any decision fa-
vors some clients' interests over others, the sounder ethical
" Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(b)(1).
' Thomas Shaffer and Robert Cochran, in their book on lawyer-client moral dis-
course, make the case for engaging clients in discussion concerning both the objectives and
the means involved in the representation. See Thomas L. Shaffer and Robert F. Cochran,
Jr., Lawyers, Clients, and Moral Responsibility (West 1994). They offer a conception of the
lawyer-client relationship as one that respects and enhances client decisionmaking. The
mass plaintiffs lawyer I envision in this paper, I fear, may fit their uncomplimentary
description of the Lawyer as Godfather. "Godfather lawyers either decide what their cli-
ents' interests are, without consulting their clients, or they persuade their clients to accept
lawyers' views on what their interests are." Id at 8. While in most contexts I agree with
Shaffer and Cochran's conception of the ideal lawyer-client relationship, I worry that it
would disserve most plaintiff clients in mass litigation. In mass representation, the mo-
ment for engaging in discourse with the client concerning the objectives and means of the
representation is at the outset, and not ordinarily during the course of litigation and nego-
tiation. Those clients who prefer a lawyer-client relationship with ongoing client auton-
omy, and who are willing to forgo the sum of the advantages of group representation,
ought not to retain the lawyer with a massive inventory of clients. This moment of
autonomous client decisionmaking at the outset is what can be achieved with the conflict
waiver procedure this paper outlines in Part III.
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course for the lawyer is to advance the overall interests of the
group.1
5 5
The alternative is for lawyers to refuse to represent multiple
similarly situated plaintiffs because of the potential conflicts. In
other words, as a matter of legal ethics, the conflict could be
deemed disqualifying and unwaivable. Disqualification, however,
deprives clients of their chosen counsel. In mass litigation, clients
choose established counsel not despite counsel's long list of simi-
larly situated clients, but because of it. Many plaintiffs benefit
from the expertise, experience, resources, and bargaining power
of lawyers with substantial inventories of claims. If the clients
would give informed consent because they are likely better off
with collective representation than without it, then as a matter of
legal ethics it is hard to justify depriving plaintiffs of that choice.
Rarely, however, do mass litigators seek their clients' consent
to the inherent client-client conflicts of interest in mass collective
representation. Lawyers' failure to obtain client consent is driven
in part by skepticism about the ability of clients to understand
the inherent conflicts, which seem less concrete and immediate
than client-client conflicts in other contexts, and a concomitant
skepticism concerning the usefulness and enforceability of client
waivers."'6
"Informed consent"' 57 requires the lawyer to give clients the
information they need in order to make an informed decision con-
cerning whether to go forward with retaining the lawyer notwith-
standing a potential conflict of interest. A lawyer handling mass
litigation should inform the client that the lawyer represents a
large number of similar plaintiffs, or that she is coordinating
" A more difficult conflict of interest question is presented by collective representa-
tion in the form of counsel coordination in formally or informally aggregated litigation. See
Erichson, 50 Duke L J at 430 (cited in note 29). Lawyers involved in common interest
agreements with aligned counsel may face concurrent conflicts of interest even if they do
not form any client-lawyer relationships with the coordinating lawyers' clients. Contrac-
tual or agency duties to coordinating lawyers may give rise to conflicts of interest under
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(a)(2) by creating a risk that a lawyer's representa-
tion of her own client will be "materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to .. . a
third person." Compare ABA Committee On Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal
Op. 395 (1995).
"' Telephone interview with Paul D. Rheingold, Esq. (November 13, 2002).
17 The Ethics 2000 Commission brought the term "informed consent" into the Model
Rules, especially the rules governing conflicts of interest, with the following definition:
"'Informed consent' denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct
after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the ma-
terial risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct."
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.0(e).
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closely with other lawyers in the litigation. She should further
inform the client that such collective representation offers a
number of advantages that benefit the plaintiffs as a group, but
may involve trade-offs that do not work to the advantage of each
plaintiff individually. She should explain that potential conflicts
may arise between group interests and the client's individual in-
terests, and that the lawyer intends to resolve such conflicts in
favor of pursuing group interests.'" Armed with information
about the collective representation, its advantages, and its inher-
ent conflicts of interest, clients should have the opportunity to
decline the representation under those terms, and instead to seek
separate counsel.
A careful agreement not only would inform the client of the
potential conflicts of interest, but also would function as an ex-
press limitation on the scope of representation."9 If a lawyer in-
tends to pursue litigation to maximize the interests of a group of
plaintiffs, then the client should understand that the lawyer in-
"a One California firm that represented numerous individual plaintiffs suing over the
release of a toxic chemical from a refinery included the following language in its retainer
agreement for that litigation:
Attorneys may represent other persons damaged by the releases mentioned
herein and Client understands that such multiple representation has advan-
tages, but also may give rise to potential conflicts of interest of which Client
is hereby advised. Each person's recovery may depend on factors such as age,
severity of injury, extent of medical treatment, amount and duration of expo-
sure, pre-existing health condition. Despite such potential conflicts of interest
Client believes that the advantages of multiple representation outweigh any
potential disadvantage and hereby waives any and all conflicts of interest
that may arise from such multiple representation. Client acknowledges that
Client has had the opportunity to discuss the question of conflict of interest
with Attorneys and that this waiver is made after all questions have been
fully answered.
Ferguson v Meadows, 2002 WL 31033065, *1 (Cal App) (unpublished) (quoting retainer
agreement), rev granted (Dec 18, 2002). While ideally the agreement should explain more
clearly the types of inter-plaintiff conflicts that may arise during the litigation, this re-
tainer agreement embodies the general spirit of what I am advocating: disclosure of the
potential conflicts in collective representation and informed consent by the client. In the
Ferguson case, the court pointed to this language, among other things, in affirming sum-
mary judgment for the firm in a legal malpractice action brought by a pair of dissatisfied
clients whose claims had been absorbed into a mandatory class action. See id.
" See MRPC 1.2(c) ("A lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the limita-
tion is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent."). See
also Indianapolis Podiatry, PC v Efroymson, 720 NE2d 376, 381 (Ind App 1999) (noting
that "the extent of disclosure to a client required when the scope of representation is being
limited is similar, if not identical, to that required in the context of a conflict of interest");
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co v Foster, 528 So 2d 255, 289 (Miss 1988) (Robertson
dissenting) (noting that a lawyer, with client consent, may limit the scope of representa-
tion to represent a client only to the extent there is no conflict between the client and
another, where the conflict is inchoate at the outset of the representation).
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tends to represent the client as part of the group, and not to the
extent the individual client's interests significantly diverge from
the group's. In seeking the client's informed consent not only to
the conflict of interest, but also to the limitation on the scope of
representation, the lawyer should be sure the client understands
that mass collective representation differs from the traditional
individual lawyer-client relationship.
With honest information concerning the lawyer's intent to
pursue collective interests, most clients would consent to the col-
lective representation. And they should. For most plaintiffs in
mass litigation, the wiser course is to retain a lawyer who is part
of a coordinated group effort, or who serves a sufficient number of
clients to obtain the benefits of collective representation. In mass
litigation, collective representation tends to level the field against
powerful defendants. Plaintiffs with negative value claims virtu-
ally always would prefer collective representation, but many
other plaintiffs maximize the value of their claims by litigating
collectively as well.
A small number of plaintiffs, however, would decline the col-
lective representation and seek individual representation. And
they should. Some plaintiffs possess sufficiently high-stakes
claims to justify substantial litigation investment. These clients
rationally can consider whether individual or collective represen-
tation will maximize their recovery. Individuals with divergent
preferences concerning autonomy and the client-lawyer relation-
ship, too, might decide to favor individual representation if they
can find lawyers willing to take their cases.
By treating the inevitable priority-setting and aggregate fo-
cus of collective representation as waivable concurrent client-
client conflicts of interest, lawyers can give each client an oppor-
tunity to decide whether the relinquishment of autonomy makes
sense in terms of that client's opportunities and preferences. In
effect, non-class collective representation, if each client gives in-
formed consent to the concurrent client-client conflicts, functions
like an opt-in class action.
Within collective representation, some conflicts do not pit an
individual against the larger group, but rather subgroup against
subgroup. To understand such inter-subgroup conflicts, we natu-
rally turn to the treatment of subclasses in class actions. In certi-
fying a class action, a court may certify subclasses to address con-
564 [2003:
519] CURRENT ISSUES IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 565
flicts within the larger class.' 6° The Supreme Court, in Amchem
and Ortiz, encouraged greater use of subclassing by striking
down the settlement class actions in those cases in part for their
failure to provide separate representation for subgroups with di-
vergent interests. 161 The Court emphasized that class actions
must provide "structural assurance of fair and adequate repre-
sentation for the diverse groups and individuals affected."162
Looking to the law of class actions for guidance on how to
treat non-class collective representation, one might think that
any conflict that would require subclassing should constitute an
unwaivable conflict of interest. In other words, if an inter-
subgroup conflict would prevent a lawyer from representing two
subgroups collectively by the class action mechanism, then ar-
guably the conflict should prevent a lawyer from representing
them by non-class collective representation. This, however, would
be a mistake. The coherence required for a class action differs
from the lack of conflicts required for multiple representation.
Because class actions bind absent class members, they require
greater coherence.'6 In this regard, individual informed consent
to potential conflicts of interest should make it possible, in some
circumstances, for attorneys to represent groups of plaintiffs with
generally aligned but somewhat conflicting interests, even where
those conflicting interests would make it impossible to represent
the larger group in a single class action without subclasses.
Serious inter-subgroup conflicts, however, may be disqualify-
ing and unwaivable. Lawyers do not enjoy an unlimited right to
seek clients' consent to conflicts of interest. The conflict of inter-
est rules expressly limit informed consent to situations in which
the lawyer has an objectively reasonable belief that, notwith-
standing the conflict, she can represent each client competently
and diligently." Group conflicts that would prevent the attorney
'6 See FRCP 23(c)(4) ("When appropriate .. . a class may be divided into subclasses
and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be con-
strued and applied accordingly.").
161 See Ortiz, 527 US 815; Amchem Products, Inc v Windsor, 521 US 591 (1997).
,62 Amchem, 521 US at 627.
63 In terms of the general prerequisites for class certification, Rule 23 demands co-
herence through the requirements of commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representa-
tion. See FRCP 23(a)(2)-(4). Rule 23(b)(3) class certification involves the additional re-
quirements that common questions predominate over individual ones, and that the class
action be a superior means of handling the litigation. See FRCP 23(b)(3).
16' MRPC 1.7(b)(1). Regardless of consent, a lawyer may not represent a client if the
representation involves "the assertion of a claim by one client against another client rep-
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from giving sound representation to each subgroup are impermis-
sible, regardless of informed consent. Such conflicts are distin-
guishable from less serious inter-subgroup conflicts, and are dis-
tinguishable as well from conflicts between the individual and the
group that inhere in collective representation but are undifferen-
tiated ex ante.
Given the potential conflicts between individual and group
interests in mass collective representation, one might ask, why
not require judicial approval for undertaking such representa-
tion?65 One could imagine a rule prohibiting mass collective rep-
resentation in the absence of court approval. In other words,
rather than look to the class opt-out process, why not look instead
to the class certification process?"6
Addressing collective representation problems under the con-
flict of interest rules promises to be more workable than a com-
pulsory judicial approval process. The highly contextual line-
drawing in this realm lends itself initially to a lawyer-centered
rather than court-centered solution. On a small scale basis, law-
yers often represent multiple parties with related claims, such as
two passengers suing a taxi company for injuries sustained due to
negligent driving. No one contends that such representation
automatically should trigger a need for judicial approval. Rather,
we rely on the lawyer to consider whether the multiple represen-
tation is permitted under conflict of interest rules. 167 In general,
judicial consideration of such multiple representation comes only
if an opposing party moves to disqualify counsel based on the con-
flict. To the extent one might propose requiring judicial approval
for mass collective representation but not for smaller scale multi-
ple representation, it presents a difficult line-drawing problem.
Instead of two taxicab passengers, the clients may be two dozen
bus passengers, two hundred hotel fire victims, or two thousand
persons exposed to a toxic product. At what point does the repre-
sentation become a mass collective representation requiring judi-
resented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal."
MRPC (b)(3).
" In invoking judicial supervision to address problems of mass collective representa-
tion, this suggestion relates to the idea of judicial approval of settlements and fees in
collective representation. See text accompanying note 31.
1 See FRCP 23(c) (describing the class certification process).
"6 For example, if the potential clients were not two taxi passengers, but rather an
automobile passenger and driver both suing the driver of another car, then the lawyer
would have to consider the conflict of interest created if the passenger has a claim against
the driver of her own car. See MRPC 1.7.
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cial approval? The question cannot be answered numerically, be-
cause the extent of collective representation depends on how
closely related the claims are, which varies widely. To the stan-
dard objection that all of law involves line-drawing, and that
boundary problems do not render distinctions meaningless,'6 it
should be noted that this line-drawing problem is not limited to
how courts should decide the issue. Rather, this problem involves
whether a lawyer must seek judicial approval at all. It is particu-
larly problematic to put lawyers in the position of not knowing
whether or not they need judicial approval in order to proceed
with a representation. By contrast, for purposes of class certifica-
tion, the class action rule provides a neat line requiring certifica-
tion if an action is to be treated explicitly as representative litiga-
tion. While a central point of this Article is that in practice the
line between class and non-class litigation is not as neat as it ap-
pears to be, that does not change the fact that the class action
rule requires class certification only for explicitly representative
litigation.
By treating collective representation in terms of conflicts of
interest, rather than in terms of compulsory judicial approval, we
avoid the need to make "mass collective representation" a defined
term. The lawyer representing multiple similarly situated cli-
ents-whether two or two thousand-must consider whether the
representation creates a conflict of interest, and faces a risk of
disqualification or disciplinary sanctions for proceeding with a
prohibited representation or, if the conflict may be consented to,
for proceeding without the clients' informed consent.
B. Client Autonomy at Settlement
1. Class actions: settlement opt-out.
In addition to the opt-out right at the outset of class repre-
sentation, class members may receive an equally significant mo-
ment of autonomy: the decision whether to opt out of a class set-
tlement. Sometimes, this occurs by a back-end opt-out opportu-
nity in a litigation class action, in which class members are given
a second opportunity to opt out of the class after seeing the terms
of a settlement. More often, class members' opportunities to ex-
16 See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 121-50 (Oxford 1961).
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clude themselves from a settlement with knowledge of the set-
tlement terms comes in settlement class actions.
The 2002 proposed amendments to the federal class action
rule, at Rule 23(e)(3), explicitly authorize courts to permit a sec-
ond opt-out opportunity upon approval of a class settlement: "In
an action previously certified as a class action under Rule
23(b)(3), the court may refuse to approve a settlement unless it
affords a new opportunity to request exclusion to individual class
members who had an earlier opportunity to request exclusion but
did not do so."" The Advisory Committee Note adds that an
"agreement by the parties themselves to permit class members to
elect exclusion at this point by the settlement agreement may be
one factor supporting approval of the settlement."'7 ° The second
opt-out rule represents part of a broader trend in class action liti-
gation toward multiple and back-end opt-outs, ' and it relates as
well to recent academic literature on the importance of exit rights
as safeguards in class actions. 72 By permitting class members in
some cases to decline a settlement by opting out of the settled
class action, the proposed rule recognizes the importance of
autonomy in settlement decisions. It also demonstrates a way to
enhance autonomy without offering any increased role in the pur-
suit of the collective litigation.
Settlement class actions provide a more common setting for
settlement opt-outs. In a settlement class action, the terms of the
settlement are agreed upon before class certification is sought.
Thus, in any settlement class action certified under Rule 23(b)(3),
class members may decide whether or not to participate in the
settlement simply by exercising their initial opt-out right.'7 3 The
Advisory Committee Note to proposed Rule 23(e)(3) acknowledges
that the rule does not affect Rule 23(b)(3) settlement class ac-
61 Proposed FRCP 23(e)(3) (May 20, 2002).
'70 Proposed FRCP 23(e)(3), Advisory Committee Note (May 20, 2002). The note adds
a sensible suggestion to prevent misuse of the second opt-out: "The court might direct...
that class members who elect exclusion are bound by rulings on the merits made before
the settlement was proposed for approval." Id.
' For an interesting analysis of the multiple opt-out provisions in the diet drugs
settlement class action, see Nagareda, 115 Harv L Rev at 797-805 (cited in note 5).
' See, for example, Coffee, 100 Colum L Rev at 419-22 (cited in note 7).
... Thus, in the settlement class action rejected in Amchem, which was certified under
Rule 23(b)(3), plaintiffs could opt out after learning the terms of the settlement. See 521
US at 605. By contrast, in the settlement class action rejected in Ortiz, which was certi-
fied under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), plaintiffs had no right to opt out. See 527 US at 824.
[2003:
519] CURRENT ISSUES IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
tions, in which settlement opt-out occurs by definition. ' 74 Settle-
ment class actions emerged and grew in the 1980s and 1990s, 17 5
and remain viable notwithstanding the Supreme Court's rejection
of two asbestos settlement class actions in Amchem 76 and Ortiz.1 77
2. Non-class collective representation: informed consent to
aggregate settlement.
Conflicts of interest among collectively represented clients
may arise during settlement negotiations, even in the absence of
apparent conflicts of interest at the outset of representation. A
recent ABA Litigation Section report described the problem:
Even when the lawyer's initial conclusion that multiple
clients can be represented was well-founded, however,
consideration later of possible settlement options can gen-
erate circumstances where interests emerge as potentially
divergent, if not actually conflicting. Conflicts can arise
from differences among clients in the strength of their po-
sitions or the level of their interest in settlement, or from
proposals to treat clients in different ways or to treat dif-
ferently positioned clients in the same way. 17
Particularly when settlement of multiple clients' claims is negoti-
ated as a lump sum, or when individual settlements are made
mutually contingent, conflict of interest cannot be avoided. The
law governing lawyers has long recognized this problem, and ad-
dressed it by the aggregate settlement rule. 179 Model Rule of Pro-
fessional Conduct 1.8(g) provides:
" See Proposed FRCP 23(e)(3), Advisory Committee Note (May 20, 2002) ("Often
there is an opportunity to opt out at this point because the class is certified and settlement
is reached in circumstances that lead to simultaneous notice of certification and notice of
settlement. In these cases, the basic opportunity to elect exclusion applies without further
complication.").
,, On the rapid growth of settlement class actions, see Howard M. Erichson, Mass
Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice, 87 Geo L J 1983, 1996-97 (1999).
'76 521 US 591.
,71 527 US 815.
178 ABA Litigation Section, Ethical Guidelines for Settlement Negotiations (Aug
2002).
171 See Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(g); Model Code of Professional Respon-
sibility DR 5-106. See also Abbott v Kidder Peabody & Co, 42 F Supp 2d 1046 (D Colo
1999) (voiding "steering committee" arrangement, in which committee could enter binding
settlement on behalf of all, as against public policy because it deprived individual clients
of the right to control their cases); Arce v Burrow, 958 SW2d 239 (Tex App 1997) (holding
settlement of hundreds of claims involving a plant explosion to violate aggregate settle-
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A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not par-
ticipate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims of
or against the clients,. . .unless each client gives informed
consent, in a writing signed by the client. The lawyer's
disclosure shall include the existence and nature of all the
claims or pleas involved and of the participation of each
person in the settlement.i'°
The aggregate settlement rule, though stated specifically at
MRPC 1.8(g), could be derived by straightforward application of
several more general rules governing conflicts of interest,181 the
duty to inform and advise,82 and the rule protecting the client's
autonomy to determine the objectives of the representation and,
specifically, to determine whether to accept or reject a settle-
ment.' 83
Under the aggregate settlement rule, a lawyer negotiating a
settlement on a collective basis84 must get each client's informed
consent to that client's participation in the settlement. The cli-
ent's right to decide whether to accept or decline a settlement of-
fer, in other words, must not be diminished by the collective nego-
tiation of settlement terms. In this way, block settlements should
resemble opt-out settlement class actions, or class settlements
with a back-end opt-out. If negotiations in non-class litigation
result in a massive block settlement in which the defendant
agrees to be bound by the settlement only if 90 percent of the
plaintiffs accept it, application of the aggregate settlement rule
leaves the settlement roughly resembling an opt-out settlement
class action with a defendant walk-away provision.
Professors Charles Silver and Lynn Baker have urged that
clients be permitted ex ante to waive their right under MRPC
ment rule); Quintero v Jim Walter Homes, Inc, 709 SW2d 225 (Tex App 1986) (holding
aggregate settlement for several hundred clients void under rule).
l0 MRPC 1.8(g).
... MRPC 1.7.
MRPC 1.4.
1 MRPC 1.2(a). See also Fred C. Zacharias, Limits on Client Autonomy in Legal
Ethics Regulation, 81 BU L Rev 199, 214-15 (2001) ("[Tlhe aggregate settlement rule of
1.8(g) has as its core concern that each client render a personal decision on whether to
accept a joint settlement . . .. The rule implements autonomy on the assumption that,
once the individual client is fully informed, there is no reason to question the client's
choice.").
" For an analytical description of various forms of aggregate settlements, see text
accompanying note 52.
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1.8(g) to reduce the risk of extortionate hold-outs."' It is impor-
tant for clients to retain the right to decline an aggregate settle-
ment, however. Several advantages follow from giving each client
the right to accept or reject that client's individual share of a set-
tlement negotiated for the group, and the hold-out risk is lower
than Professors Silver and Baker suggest.
The client's right to reject a settlement maintains an impor-
tant incentive on lawyers to negotiate adequate settlements.'8
One monitoring effect on counsel goes to the adequacy of the
overall settlement amount.187 This affects both plaintiffs' counsel
and defendants. Plaintiffs' counsel and defendants share an in-
terest in maximizing the number of plaintiffs who accept the ne-
gotiated group settlement. To the extent defendants negotiate a
walk-away provision, it contributes to the pressure on plaintiffs'
counsel to make sure the settlement will appeal to plaintiffs.
An even more important monitoring effect on counsel goes to
the lawyers' incentive to allocate settlements fairly. Beyond the
adequacy of the total settlement, individual allocations matter for
horizontal equity and its inverse, the propositions that plaintiffs
with equal claims should receive equal amounts under the set-
tlement, and plaintiffs with unequal claims should receive pro-
portionally unequal amounts. This is more important than the
monitoring effect as to overall size of settlement, because plain-
tiffs' counsel's incentive is tied to overall settlement amount.
Plaintiffs' counsel on a contingent fee, like class counsel antici-
" Charles Silver and Lynn Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settlement Rule,
32 Wake Forest L Rev 733 (1997); see also Charles Silver and Lynn A. Baker, I Cut, You
Choose: The Role of Plaintiffs' Counsel in Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 Va L Rev
1465 (1998).
" Other mechanisms can help protect clients' interests in fair settlements. For ex-
ample, special masters often are assigned to devise settlement allocations in mass litiga-
tion. Similarly, judicial supervision of settlement processes and judicial approval of set-
tlements can offer some protection. This paper's focus on conflict of interest law, particu-
larly the aggregate settlement rule, as a mechanism for protecting clients' interest in
equitable settlement allocations, should not be taken as a rejection of other safeguards. As
noted earlier, a productive avenue of inquiry may be to consider whether non-class collec-
tive litigation would benefit from judicial supervision of settlements and fees along the
lines of such supervision in class litigation. See text accompanying notes 31-32. However,
requiring judicial approval of settlements in mass collective representation would raise
line-drawing issues that are avoided by treating the issue under the law governing con-
flicts of interest. See text accompanying notes 165-68.
... In terms of incentives on plaintiffs' lawyers, contingent percentage fees encourage
maximization of the total recovery. Plaintiffs' right to reject the settlement reinforces this
incentive for their lawyers, and adds an incentive for defendants to negotiate a settlement
that is sufficiently attractive to plaintiffs.
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pating a percent-of-outcome fee award,1 '8, seeks to maximize the
aggregate settlement amount, but if plaintiffs are not free to re-
ject their settlements, counsel has little financial incentive to en-
sure that each plaintiff receives an equitable allocation of that
sum based on the strength of the claim and the degree of harm.
Worse yet, plaintiffs' counsel may have financial interests
that conflict with equitable allocation of the settlement. Attorney
Paul Rheingold explains the potential client-lawyer conflicts:
A law firm with a large inventory has some cases referred
to it, whereby it has to give up a forwarding fee. Other
cases came directly from the client. The more the settle-
ments are paid to those who have no forwarder, the more
the law firm makes. The law firm will, therefore, be more
inclined to favor those clients who came directly to the law
firm. Other examples of favoring one client over another
include favoring a "squeaky wheel" client, favoring a rela-
tive, or favoring a friend of the family. 
189
A similar conflict may arise if lawyers use a sliding scale contin-
gent fee, 19° rather than a fixed percentage. If the fees will be paid
on a decreasing scale, then the lawyer has an incentive to spread
settlements more evenly by reducing the allocations for plaintiffs
with the strongest claims, in order to keep individual settlements
under certain break points. Even in the absence of any particular
incentives contrary to fair allocation, it is problematic that with-
out the aggregate settlement rule, clients have little power to
monitor their lawyer's work with regard to settlement allocation.
If the client retains the right to reject the client's portion of
an aggregate settlement, however, then the lawyers have a
strong incentive to allocate fairly. This monitoring effect, too,
works on both plaintiffs' counsel and the defendant. In fact, it
works significantly more strongly on the defendant. If plaintiffs
cannot individually decline their settlements, then the defendant
cares only about the aggregate amount. If plaintiffs retain the
power to decline their settlements, however, then a defendant
faces a powerful incentive to make each plaintiff's individual set-
' See Report of the Third Circuit Task Force on Court-Awarded Attorneys' Fees
(1985).
89 See Paul D. Rheingold, Ethical Constraints on Aggregated Settlements of Mass-Tort
Cases, 31 Loy LA L Rev 395, 396-97 (1998).
"90 See, for example, NJ Ct R 1:21-7(c) (imposing statutory contingent fee cap for tort
cases on a downward sliding scale).
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tlement allocation appealing enough for the plaintiff to accept. If
a defendant reaches a fair overall settlement sum with plaintiffs'
counsel based on arms-length negotiations, but fails to ensure an
equitable allocation among the plaintiffs, then it is the defendant
who is penalized primarily. Most of those plaintiffs who receive
an over-allocation would accept the settlement, while most of
those who get an under-allocation presumably would reject it.
The defendant would end up overpaying the plaintiffs in the set-
tlement, and facing a stream of claims from those who expect
more. Thus, the defendant has every incentive to work with
plaintiffs' counsel to ensure an equitable allocation. Clients' re-
tention of power to reject settlements individually provides the
best assurance of arms-length negotiations that go not only to the
aggregate amount, but also to individual allocations. In contrast
to other contexts in which the aligned incentives of defendants
and plaintiffs' counsel work to the disadvantage of plaintiffs,19' in
this context, the aligned incentives work to protect plaintiffs from
careless or unfair allocations.
In addition to providing a monitoring effect on the negotiat-
ing lawyers, client autonomy at settlement enables clients to ef-
fectuate individualistic preferences. Even assuming perfect eq-
uity in the allocation of settlement funds, taking into account the
strengths of claims, some clients may rationally choose to accept
the settlement while others rationally choose to reject it, based on
different approaches to settlement decisionmaking, different lev-
els of risk tolerance, and different objectives and priorities in the
litigation. Plaintiffs have different levels of risk aversion, for ex-
ample. Plaintiffs with a high tolerance for risk may rationally
decline a settlement that most plaintiffs would accept; the group
lawyer may reasonably negotiate and recommend a settlement
that most clients would find acceptable, based on average risk
aversion. Plaintiffs' objectives vary as well, with many seeking to
maximize their monetary recovery, but others preferring injunc-
tive relief. While some clients may avoid collective representation
from the outset because they know that they wish to pursue pri-
marily institutional change or other non-monetary relief, such
preferences may be difficult to anticipate ex ante. The client's
individual right to accept or reject a collectively negotiated set-
tlement maintains the most critical aspect of client autonomy
... See Erichson, 87 Geo L J at 2002-03 (cited in note 175) (discussing the risk of
collusion in settlement class actions).
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without unduly restricting counsel's freedom to pursue collective
interests during the course of the litigation and negotiation.
As to the risk that plaintiffs will withhold their consent to an
aggregate settlement to extort a premium, it should not present a
significant problem unless defendants insist on all-or-nothing
package settlement deals.19 The holdout plaintiff's extortion lev-
erage depends on the power to undermine the deal. If the deal
goes forward for the remaining parties notwithstanding one
plaintiff's rejection of the settlement, that plaintiff's holdout
power is negligible. While all-or-nothing settlements are known
to be used, conscientious application of the aggregate settlement
rule should render such packages generally unappealing to both
plaintiffs' counsel and defendants, because of the risk that a re-
jection would void the settlement. Total peace is more than de-
fendants can reasonably expect from a settlement in most cir-
cumstances. Thus, walk-away provisions generally do not require
100 percent acceptance of the settlement.93
Contrary to the opinion of those who view the aggregate set-
tlement rule as suited only to small-scale multi-party settle-
ments,tm MRPC 1.8(g) serves valuable functions in mass collec-
tive representation. The mass context, however, requires inter-
pretation of the rule with sensitivity to the special concerns of
mass litigation and settlement. For mass settlements, MRPC
1.8(g) should be interpreted in light of the resemblance between a
non-class mass settlement and a settlement class action or a liti-
gation class action with settlement opt-out.1 95 In particular, the
192 On the various structures of block settlements, see text accompanying notes 49-52.
"g See Rheingold, ATLA Annual Convention Reference Materials at 478 (July 2002)
("Knowledgeable counsels will not paint themselves into a corner whereby all of their
clients must agree to the plan. Given human nature and the variable way people see the
world, it is predictable that not all clients will take a predetermined offer, no matter its
seeming reasonableness."). Rheingold notes that a "figure of 90 percent acceptance has
been used." Id.
1' See, for example, Fred Misko, Jr., A Professional Responsibility Checklist for the
Class Action and Mass Tort Practitioner, University of Texas School of Law Ethics and
Mass Torts Symposium (1998) ("While consulting with and gaining the unanimous con-
sent of several plaintiffs is relatively manageable, doing the same where there are hun-
dreds or thousands of plaintiffs in a mass tort case can be an extremely difficult and ex-
pensive undertaking."); Rheingold, ATLA Annual Convention Reference Materials at 477
("One could accommodate to this rule if one were representing two passengers in an auto-
mobile accident. But how about 1000 persons, spread all over the country? .. . As many
people have recognized, the ethics codes are out of date when it comes to mass tort.").
19 In some cases involving massive aggregate settlements, courts have declined to
find violations, especially where procedural safeguards resemble class action procedure.
See In re Polybutylene Plumbing Litigation, 23 SW3d 428 (Tex App 2000) (finding no vio-
lation of rule by non-class aggregate settlement of approximately sixty thousand mass tort
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rule's requirement that "disclosure shall include the existence
and nature of all the claims . . involved and of the participation
of each person in the settlement" should not apply in mass litiga-
tion precisely as it does in smaller cases. In an aggregate settle-
ment of a case involving three passengers suing a driver, each
passenger should know how much money each of the other two
would receive in the settlement. In mass representation, how-
ever, it should suffice to disclose the information a client rea-
sonably needs in order to decide whether to accept the settle-
ment, such as the total amount of the settlement, the number of
plaintiffs, and any formula or grid used in calculating settlement
amounts. It ordinarily should not be necessary, in mass represen-
tation, to disclose each individual name, injury, and amount. Dis-
closure of detailed individual information infringes on client con-
fidentiality to an extent unjustified by the purposes of the aggre-
gate settlement rule. Rather, the MRPC 1.8(g) disclosure in mass
non-class settlements should be treated more like notice in a set-
tlement class action, which provides the information a reasonable
client would need in order to decide whether to opt out.
By complying with the aggregate settlement rule, flexibly
construed in light of the similarities between collective litigation
and class actions, lawyers in non-class litigation should give each
client a meaningful opportunity to decide whether to participate
in a settlement that has been negotiated on behalf of a group. In
this regard, a settlement resulting from collective representation
may be treated as an opt-in settlement class action, perhaps with
a defendant walk-away provision.
CONCLUSION
Mass litigation often proceeds with clients collectively repre-
sented by counsel, with or without the formal procedural recogni-
tion of class certification. While class actions retain the distinc-
tion of binding absent class members, non-class collective repre-
sentation resembles class actions in the critical respect that
claims brought by single firm, in which a special master approved the allocation formula);
In re Matter of an Anonymous Member of the South Carolina Bar, 377 SE2d 567 (SC 1989)
(declining to discipline attorney representing numerous clients in environmental tort
litigation, despite failure to comply with strict requirements of aggregate settlement rule).
See also Scamardella v Illiano, 727 A2d 421 (Md Ct of Spec App 1999) (finding that aggre-
gate settlement did not violate Rule 1.8(g), despite failure to inform individual plaintiffs of
distribution, because settlement represented maximum potential recovery).
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plaintiffs depend upon counsel over whom they have little control
and whose loyalty is directed to group interests.
Most, but not all, plaintiffs whose claims fall within a mass
litigation prefer to pursue claims collectively, even in the absence
of a class action. Collective representation offers several advan-
tages for plaintiffs facing defendants who ordinarily command
greater resources and invest heavily in defense. By combining the
stakes of many plaintiffs, collective representation provides group
lawyers sufficient incentive to invest heavily in the litigation. It
allows lawyers to take advantage of economies of scale, reducing
the per-plaintiff cost of litigating. In addition, collective represen-
tation often enhances plaintiffs' bargaining leverage. In sum, col-
lective representation-whether by gathering clients or by coor-
dinating with other counsel, and whether by formal or informal
aggregation-tends to level the playing field.
Not all plaintiffs prefer collective representation, however.
Some may prefer autonomy and an individual relationship with
counsel. Others, particularly those with high-value claims, may
consider individual representation the best way to maximize
their recovery. For these clients, the loss of autonomy and indi-
vidual attention outweighs the benefits of collective representa-
tion. Moreover, the relinquishment of client autonomy, while es-
sential to effective group representation, raises concerns about
counsel's incentive to ensure equity among plaintiffs in settle-
ment allocation.
The question is how to enable lawyers to advance the inter-
ests of most plaintiffs through collective representation, while
maintaining those critical aspects of client autonomy that allow
clients to effectuate preferences for individual representation and
to establish incentives for equity among plaintiffs as well as
maximizing the total recovery. An answer can be found by look-
ing first to class action concepts and then to the law of profes-
sional responsibility. First, we must recognize the essential simi-
larity between class actions and non-class collective representa-
tion in terms of the relinquishment of client autonomy. While
class actions differ in important respects from non-class litiga-
tion, they share the essential attribute that lawyer loyalty is di-
rected toward the group, and individual members of the collective
have little control over the conduct of the litigation. Next, by look-
ing to the law governing concurrent conflicts of interest, we can
see how to protect client autonomy at the two most critical junc-
tures-the outset of collective representation and acceptance of a
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settlement-while empowering group lawyers to pursue collective
interests in the conduct of the litigation.
Collective representation ordinarily presents both client-
client and lawyer-client conflicts of interest. Many of the conflicts,
however, are of the sort that would be tolerated for purposes of
class certification, and can be consented to under the law govern-
ing lawyers. If plaintiffs' counsel intends to seek to maximize
group interests, which presents inherent conflicts of interest, she
should get informed consent from the clients at the outset of the
collective representation.
In addition to their decision up front whether to accept collec-
tive representation, clients should be given another moment of
autonomy at the back end, to decide whether to accept their por-
tion of a collective settlement. Back-end autonomy remains criti-
cal because it gives counsel an incentive to strive for equity
among plaintiffs, and it gives clients an additional opportunity to
effectuate individualistic preferences without excessively restrict-
ing counsel's ability to pursue group interests during the course
of the litigation and negotiation. However, the informed consent
process in the context of mass litigation need not require the dis-
closure of the same individual details that would be required in
the aggregate settlement of the claims of several passengers in an
automobile negligence case. As in the notice of a settlement class
action, or notice of a second opt-out opportunity upon settlement
of a litigation class action, the disclosure for informed consent to
an aggregate settlement need only contain the information rea-
sonably necessary for plaintiffs to decide whether to accept the
settlement.
Class actions offer a picture of collective litigation in which
the represented parties relinquish control over the conduct of liti-
gation and negotiation, but are given book-end moments of
autonomy: at the outset, and increasingly, at settlement. Non-
class collective litigation can follow the same model. The client
should retain key moments of autonomy at the opening and clos-
ing, but for the course of the litigation and negotiation, the law-
yer should pursue the litigation in the best interests of the group.
This paper's position on collective representation will face
serious resistance from both directions. Traditionalists will object
that my proposal dilutes the lawyer's duty of loyalty to individual
clients, and that informed consent should not license lawyers to
act contrary to the individual interests and directives of their cli-
ents. To them, I respond that effective plaintiff representation in
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mass litigation often requires collective representation, and that
the value of a collective approach to loyalty should be measured
from the client's ex ante perspective. From the opposite direction,
some pragmatists will contend that informed consent is meaning-
less in the absence of a concrete conflict that clients can under-
stand, and that vigorous enforcement of the aggregate settlement
rule constricts the ability to settle mass litigation. To them, I re-
spond that lawyers must not allow clients to enter unwittingly
into conflicted representations, even if the lawyers believe it is in
the clients' best interest. It is the lawyer's job to ensure that the
client understands the nature and scope of the representation. As
to the aggregate settlement rule, it creates a powerful incentive
for lawyers to negotiate equitable settlement allocations, and it
preserves the single most essential aspect of client autonomy.
Just as class action processes protect a core of autonomy within
representative litigation, so should lawyers give their clients two
critical moments of autonomous decision-making within mass
collective litigation.
I do not wish, however, to overextend the analogy between
class actions and non-class collective representation. Class coun-
sel's duty runs expressly to the class. The lawyer representing a
mass of similarly situated individual clients, by contrast, owes
loyalty to each client individually. But as I have tried to show,
the lawyer best serves the interests of the mass of individual cli-
ents in certain litigation by pursuing a collective strategy. Con-
flicts between individuals and the group inevitably arise during
the litigation process. Resolving a conflict in favor of the individ-
ual at the group's expense does nothing to eliminate the conflict,
and yields an inferior solution. Squeaky wheels, full fee payers,
and otherwise favored clients make this a very real risk. Rather,
the lawyer should prepare for such situations by obtaining the
clients' informed consent to collective representation at the out-
set, and when the conflict materializes, the lawyer should advise
the client of the conflict and the client's right to exit the group
representation. The lawyer then should pursue the most effective
strategy for the collective.
By obtaining clients' informed consent, the lawyer frees her-
self to pursue group interests without undue concern for the pe-
culiar interests of particular clients. The client's opportunity to
opt out of the collective representation at the moment of the con-
flict waiver should give lawyers comfort that their clients chose to
retain a lawyer who will pursue collective interests. The right to
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decline an aggregate settlement should give clients comfort that
their lawyer, while generally pursuing group interests to maxi-
mize the collective recovery, retains an incentive to negotiate an
adequate and fair settlement for each plaintiff. Satisfied with the
protection of these two key moments of autonomy, the lawyer can
focus on the zealous representation of collective interests, know-
ing that it is indeed a collective representation to which the cli-
ents have autonomously consented.

